Caldarelli, R (on the application of) v Westminster Magistrates Court

An accusation European Arrest Warrant is valid if it provides sufficient particulars of the alleged conduct, time, place and applicable law. An erroneous tick-box entry does not invalidate the warrant where the document read as a whole makes the error obvious and the warrant otherwise identifies the offence.

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, passage of time bars extradition only where surrender would be unjust or oppressive. Under section 36(8), reasonable cause for delay may exist where successive warrants issued by the same judicial authority are being dealt with, so that all properly extraditable matters can be considered while the requested person remains able to participate effectively in the proceedings.

The claimant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against extradition orders made by the Senior District Judge in respect of two European Arrest Warrants issued by the Court of Naples. One warrant concerned Mafia-related offences and the other alleged drug trafficking in 1997 and 1998. He also sought judicial review of the refusal to discharge him under section 36(8) because extradition under an earlier warrant had not occurred within the statutory period.

The issues were whether the warrants contained the information required by section 2, whether the drug warrant was invalidated by an erroneous reference to robbery, whether delay made extradition unjust or oppressive, and whether the pending proceedings on the later warrants constituted reasonable cause for delay.

1. The appeals concerning EAWs 5 and 6 were dismissed. The Mafia warrant sufficiently identified the conviction, the final appellate judgment, the offences, the applicable legal provisions and the agreed sentence. It therefore complied with section 2(6)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003. The court was bound by Louca [2008] EWHC 2907 (Admin) on the submission that the warrant had to identify earlier defective warrants.
2. The drug warrant gave sufficient particulars under section 2(4)(c). It identified the alleged conduct, the period 1997–1998, Naples, the alleged participants and the relevant provisions of Italian law. The tick against organised or armed robbery was an obvious clerical error. Reading the warrant as a whole, it was valid for drug trafficking only.
3. The passage of time did not make extradition unjust or oppressive under section 14. The investigation was large, the evidence had been gathered over time, and the Senior District Judge was entitled to conclude that neither culpable delay nor the loss of witnesses made a fair trial impossible. The Administrative Court would have reached the same conclusion whether its role was review or decision de novo.
4. The judicial review application concerning EAW 4 was refused. The statutory timetable in section 36 had expired, but the Senior District Judge was entitled to find reasonable cause for the delay. The later proceedings concerned warrants issued by the same Italian judicial authority and were directed to extradition to the same territory. It was reasonable to allow those proceedings to run their course while the claimant could attend court and give evidence, rather than require later proceedings under section 54.
5. Section 44 was not intended to govern several warrants issued by one judicial authority for surrender to the same territory. Its language and heading concerned competing warrants seeking extradition to different territories, with priority determined by factors including relative seriousness, place, date and conviction status.
6. The Framework Decision’s purpose of securing swift and orderly surrender, subject to humanitarian rights and mutual trust between Member States, supported the Senior District Judge’s conclusion. Mr Justice Forbes agreed with Lord Justice Toulson.

• House of Lords: upheld the earlier Divisional Court decision concerning EAW 4 in [2008] UKHL 51.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeals against the extradition orders concerning EAWs 5 and 6 and refused permission to apply for judicial review of the section 36(8) decision.