Slough Borough Council v Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal & Ors

Section 348(2) of the Education Act 1996 requires the local education authority to pay the whole of the fees payable for qualifying education. Section 9 does not permit a parent-and-authority fee-sharing arrangement or alter that specific statutory obligation. In assessing parental preference, the tribunal must compare the relevant educational costs and decide whether the difference involves unreasonable public expenditure. An appellate court will not remit a tribunal decision merely because the tribunal has not explained every calculation, provided its reasons identify the material comparison and enable the parties and appellate court to understand why the decision was reached.

Slough Borough Council appealed against a decision of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal concerning the school to be named in Simran Suri’s statement of special educational needs. Simran had cerebral palsy and had attended the independent non-maintained PACE Centre. Her parents wished her to remain there, while the Council proposed the publicly maintained Arbour Vale School.

The Tribunal initially preferred Arbour Vale but, on review, specified continuation at the PACE Centre for two years, subject to the parents undertaking transport costs. The Council challenged the Tribunal’s treatment of the PACE Centre’s reduced fee, the alleged joint-funding arrangement, and its calculation and explanation of the comparative cost. The central issues were the construction of sections 9 and 348(2) of the Education Act 1996 and whether the Tribunal’s reasons disclosed an error of law.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal’s decision was not vitiated by an error of law.

2. Section 348(2) of the Education Act 1996 requires the local education authority to pay the whole of the fees payable for the child’s education at the relevant school. Section 9’s general principle that education should accord with parental wishes, subject to efficient instruction and avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure, does not qualify or displace that specific obligation. Joint funding by parents and the local authority is therefore prohibited where section 348(2) applies.

3. The Tribunal had to compare the cost of continued education at the PACE Centre with the cost of education at Arbour Vale. If the £10,000 fee had represented only the authority’s contribution to a total fee of £36,000, the Tribunal would have had to take the full fee into account. On the evidence, however, the Tribunal was entitled to treat the PACE Centre’s offer as an exceptional reduced fee, subject to the unresolved question whether fundraising was being applied towards Simran’s fees.

4. That possible error could not have affected the outcome. The Tribunal had concluded that the difference between the two placements over the relevant two-year period was not overly significant, and any sum raised towards the fees up to £3,510 would not have altered that assessment. The Tribunal was also entitled to take account of the upheaval that a change of school would cause.

5. Per Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Meek v City of Birmingham Council [1987] IRLR 250, tribunal reasons must outline the relevant story, summarise the basic factual conclusions, and state sufficient reasons to show why the decision was reached and whether a question of law arises. That standard applied to the Tribunal and was satisfied. Although the Tribunal did not explain precisely how it calculated the £32,490 figure, it explained the material comparison and why the difference was not significant.

6. The respondent was awarded costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

• Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal: initially specified Arbour Vale School in the statement, then reviewed its decision and specified continuation at the PACE Centre for two years.
• High Court (Queen's Bench Division): dismissed the Council’s appeal and awarded costs.