Lovell (Nee Geraghty) v Leeds City Council

A claimant seeking contribution under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 must prove that the proposed contributor was liable for the same damage. In a negligence claim against a highway or planning authority, proof of a dangerous road condition is insufficient without proof that the authority’s breach caused the accident. Where competing causes remain reasonably possible, the claimant fails to discharge the burden of proof. A professional-negligence allegation is assessed by asking whether the authority’s acts or omissions fell outside the range open to reasonably competent traffic engineers. The authority’s failure to provide an additional warning sign will not establish liability unless the claimant proves that the sign would probably have been noticed and heeded.

The claimant sought an indemnity or contribution from Leeds City Council under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. She had settled Mr Mead’s negligence claim arising from a road accident in which he was injured while travelling as her passenger.

She alleged that the Council, as highway and planning authority, had negligently designed and managed a road layout serving a new school, thereby causing queues to extend around a blind bend. She also alleged that the Council should have erected a warning sign. The central issues were causation, professional negligence, and whether any failure to warn caused the accident.

1. Claim dismissed. The claimant failed to prove that any act or omission by Leeds City Council caused the queue, accident or injuries for which contribution was sought.
2. Under section 1 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, a person who settles a claim may recover contribution only if the proposed contributor was liable for the same damage. Section 2 requires a just and equitable assessment having regard to the person’s responsibility.
3. The presence of stationary traffic immediately beyond a blind bend was dangerous, but that fact did not establish breach or causation. The queue could have resulted from the school’s internal traffic layout, insufficient bus provision, ordinary congestion or other causes for which the Council was not responsible. Since the claimant could not show that a breach by the Council was more likely than those alternative causes, the causation case failed.
4. The court rejected the argument that the Council was negligent in failing to make an adequate school bus service a planning condition. That decision was within the range of reasonable options available at the time, and there was no evidence that such a condition would have changed travel arrangements before the accident.
5. For the professional-negligence allegations, the applicable standard was whether the impugned decisions fell outside the range open to reasonably competent traffic engineers, applying Bolitho v City and Hackney HA [1998] AC 232. The court was not required to resolve every breach issue because causation failed, but remained unpersuaded that the Council’s decisions were beyond that range.
6. The signage claim also failed. Even assuming that no queue-warning sign existed, the claimant probably would not have noticed or heeded it. The Council’s delay in providing such a sign was not unreasonable in the circumstances.
7. The findings did not determine whether the school or any non-party was at fault. The judgment concerned only the claimant’s claim against the Council.