Warring Davies v CPS Bradford

In deciding whether a motoring offence involves special reasons for avoiding endorsement, the court must assess the defendant’s conduct in the emergency as established by the case stated. A sudden medical condition may constitute special reasons where it causes an involuntary excess of speed, or where exceeding the limit is genuinely reasonable to reach the nearest safe stopping place. The relevant circumstances include the distance and manner of driving, the vehicle’s condition, the driver’s intention, traffic and danger to others, and the reason for driving. A conscious and deliberate decision to speed up, rather than an involuntary consequence of the emergency, will not ordinarily amount to special reasons.

The claimant appealed by way of case stated from the Bradford Crown Court’s dismissal of his appeal against sentence imposed by Bradford Magistrates’ Court for exceeding a 30-mile-per-hour limit. He had pleaded guilty to travelling at 37 miles per hour. He relied on the onset of a hypoglycaemic attack while driving and argued that the circumstances justified special reasons for not endorsing his licence under section 44 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

The Crown Court found that he deliberately accelerated briefly in order to reach a safe place to stop and take glucose. The central questions were whether that decision constituted a special reason and whether it was reasonable to conclude that he could instead have slowed down and stopped.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court was bound by the findings contained in the case stated. A challenge that findings were unreasonable would require specific grounds and a statement of the evidence relied on; no such basis was present.
2. A sudden medical emergency, including a hypoglycaemic attack, may constitute special reasons for a momentary excess of speed. The relevant question is whether the defendant proves that the driving was involuntary or that exceeding the limit was genuinely reasonable in order to stop at the nearest suitable opportunity. The proposition that a driver must always be judged by precisely the same standard as any other motorist, without regard to the disabling condition, was too broad.
3. In assessing an emergency, the court should consider the factors identified in Chatters v Burke [1986] 3 All ER 168: the distance driven, the manner of driving, the state of the vehicle, whether the driver intended to continue, prevailing traffic conditions, possible danger to other road users or pedestrians, and the reason for driving.
4. On the findings made, the claimant had consciously and deliberately accelerated before stopping. The excess speed was therefore not involuntary, and the Crown Court was entitled to find that there was no reasonable excuse or special reason. The questions stated for the High Court were answered affirmatively.
5. The application for the Crown’s costs was not pressed. No order for costs was made.

• Bradford Magistrates’ Court: convicted the claimant on his guilty plea and imposed sentence for exceeding the speed limit, including endorsement.
• Bradford Crown Court: dismissed the claimant’s appeal against the refusal to find special reasons.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the case-stated appeal and answered both questions in the affirmative.