G v A

Under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989, capital provision will ordinarily end when a child reaches 18 or completes tertiary education, whichever is later. A longer period requires established special or exceptional circumstances showing that dependency will continue beyond majority. The court should not impose continuing provision merely because an adult child may remain at home.

A settlement may include a reasonable gap year and a first degree course. Money directed for a specified purpose is held subject to a Quistclose-type trust to the extent that it is not properly applied. A charging order is unavailable where the order requires money to be settled on trust rather than paid to the applicant.

The mother applied under section 15 and Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 for financial provision for the child, including enforcement of an earlier order requiring the father to provide £20,000 and to settle £220,000 on trust to fund a home for the mother and child.

The father sought amendments concerning payment, accounting, trustees, timing, enforcement and the duration of the settlement. The mother sought variation, charging orders and the appointment of a receiver. The central issues included whether the settlement could continue until the child was 21, whether the £220,000 could be secured by charging order, and how the earlier order should be implemented.

1. Duration of settlement. The general principle under Schedule 1 is that capital provision ordinarily ends at majority or on completion of education. The relevant age is not invariably 18, but provision beyond majority requires evidence of special or exceptional circumstances. Dependency ordinarily ceases at majority, and adult children’s continued residence with a parent is insufficient by itself. The earlier order was therefore plainly wrong to provide for termination at 21, and “18” was substituted.
2. The settlement could extend to completion of tertiary education to first-degree level and could include one gap year, whether between secondary education and university or between a first degree and employment. A long-stop provision was appropriate to prevent indefinite delay.
3. Trust and implementation. Money ordered for a specified purpose is held on trust for the payer to the extent it is not so applied. The father was entitled to an account of the £20,000 and receipts for items exceeding £10. The £220,000 was not payable until execution of the trust deed. Two trustees were required, one appointed by each parent, neither parent being eligible to act.
4. Enforcement. Section 1(1) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 applies to an order requiring payment of money to another person. The order to settle £220,000 on the mother for the child’s benefit was not such an order. The interim charging order was therefore set aside as to that sum. The £20,000 charging order was made final, but enforcement was postponed. A receiver was refused, while an injunction restrained dealings with the relevant property, subject to the grant and termination of assured shorthold tenancies.
5. The mother’s application to vary the £220,000 provision was dismissed. Liberty to apply was granted concerning implementation and timing, including the possibility of imposing a future cut-off if delay became unreasonable. The judgment also rejected attempts to reargue substantive issues through the draft-judgment correction process.

First-instance decision. The judgment records that an earlier order of District Judge Roberts dated 10 May 2005 had been appealed and remitted conditionally by Sumner J, but the condition was not satisfied and that order remained binding.