Western Neptune (Owners, Demise Charters and Time Charterers of) v Owners and Demise Charterers of the Philadelphia Express

A tow, including a submerged or partly submerged array, is to be treated as part of the towing vessel for collision-avoidance purposes. Where prescribed lighting is impracticable, the vessel must take all possible measures to indicate the tow’s presence. The unusual scale and limited visibility of a tow may require repeated and sufficiently detailed warnings, confirmation of approaching vessels’ intentions, continued monitoring, and warnings when danger develops. Reasonable care may also require evasive measures, including diving towing equipment, where that can materially reduce damage. Liability depends on both culpability and causation. On the facts, the commercial vessel created the danger and bore two-thirds of the blame, while the towing operation bore one-third.

The claim arose from a collision in the Gulf of Mexico between the seismic survey vessel WESTERN NEPTUNE, towing a four-mile array of seismic streamers, and the container vessel ST LOUIS EXPRESS. The array was only partly marked and the vessels communicated through the chase vessel FURORE.

The defendants accepted that ST LOUIS EXPRESS bore the preponderance of blame, but alleged that WESTERN NEPTUNE was also at fault. The issues included the legal treatment of the tow, compliance with the Collision Regulations, the adequacy of lighting, radar and VHF warnings, lookout, and whether the streamers should have been dived to reduce the damage.

1. Treatment of the tow. The array was an integral part of WESTERN NEPTUNE for collision-avoidance purposes. It had no independent ability to act, and Rule 7(d)(ii) treated a tow as comparable to a very large vessel when assessing risk of collision. The towing vessel was therefore entitled to the protection applicable to a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre.
2. Lighting and indication of the array. The Collision Regulations required appropriate lights for the towing vessel and the objects being towed. Although lighting the four-mile array at intervals of not more than 100 metres was impracticable, it was practicable to exhibit all-round white lights on the relevant buoys. The blue strobe lights did not remove the need for effective measures to indicate the array’s presence. The unusual scale of the tow imposed a high standard of care in providing alternative warnings.
3. Warnings and lookout. The convoy should have made regular broadcasts identifying its position, course, speed, restricted manoeuvrability and exclusion zone. After ST LOUIS EXPRESS altered course in response to another vessel, WESTERN NEPTUNE or FURORE should have reconfirmed the required berth, explained the significance of the tail buoys, and monitored the vessel until safely clear. Once danger became apparent, appropriate warnings, including VHF, lights and flares, should have been used.
4. Diving the streamers. Diving the streamers was a reasonable last-resort precaution under Rule 17. It could have been undertaken within about six minutes and would probably have reduced the extent of the damage, even though it would not have prevented the initial contact.
5. Liability. ST LOUIS EXPRESS created the dangerous situation through faulty lookout, radar and AIS use and an improper alteration towards the array. WESTERN NEPTUNE was also at fault for inadequate reconfirmation, warning, lookout and failure to dive the streamers. Liability was apportioned one-third to WESTERN NEPTUNE and two-thirds to ST LOUIS EXPRESS.