Loader & Ors, R (on the application of) v Poole Borough Council & Anor

A planning permission notice must contain a summary of the positive reasons for granting permission, together with the relevant development-plan policies, as required by Article 22(1)(b)(i) of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995. Merely stating that a proposal has been tested against identified policies is insufficient where the notice does not explain why permission was granted. However, breach of that requirement does not automatically invalidate the permission. The court retains a discretion whether to grant relief, having regard to the significance of the failure and the substantive merits. Previous planning decisions are material considerations, but they inform rather than fetter the decision-maker’s independent judgment. A materially different proposal may properly receive a different decision, provided the planning authority acts rationally and considers the planning history.

Local residents sought judicial review of Poole Borough Council’s decision to grant planning permission for six residential blocks near Poole Harbour. Earlier proposals for development of the site had been refused, including following an inspector’s decision. The claimants argued that the decision notice failed to comply with Article 22(1)(b)(i), that the decision was inconsistent with the planning history, that the officer’s report was misleading, that a legitimate expectation had arisen, and that the decision was irrational.

The central issues were whether the notice gave adequate summary reasons and, if not, whether the court should quash the permission despite the defect.

1. Article 22 reasons. The decision notice did not comply with Article 22(1)(b)(i) of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995. Its statement that the proposal had been tested against identified development-plan policies did not state the positive reasons for granting permission. The notice therefore differed materially from the notice considered in R (on the application of Roudham and Larling Parish Council) v Breckland Council [2008] EWCA Civ 814, where the policy itself positively explained why permission was available.
2. The defect was limited. The notice made clear that the relevant objections had been considered and were regarded as sufficiently accommodated. No participant in the process could have been left in real doubt about the council’s reasons.
3. Relief. Applying the approach described in R (on the application of Wall) v Brighton and Hove City Council [2004] EWHC 2582 Admin, the court had a discretion whether to quash the permission. Because the failure was trivial in the circumstances and the substantive challenges failed, relief was refused.
4. Planning history. Previous decisions were material considerations, but consistency did not bind the council to reach the same result. The committee had been informed of the relevant history and was entitled to regard the revised proposal as materially different. Its assessment of planning merits was not irrational.
5. The officer’s report fairly and accurately summarised the history and did not contain the material mistake required by E and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49. No legitimate expectation of refusal arose from decisions concerning materially different schemes. The judicial review claim was dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused, and the defendant was awarded £22,000 costs.