Finch v Public Prosecutor Tribunal De Grande Instance Boulogne Sur Mer France

Whether extradition is oppressive by reason of delay requires an overall assessment of all the circumstances. The principal focus is the effect of the passage of time, rather than responsibility for the delay, although culpable delay may remain relevant. The seriousness of the alleged offence is also material. Time spent in custody for other offences may reduce the force of an oppression argument where extradition could not have occurred during that period. Future delay after extradition is generally speculative. Oppression is a demanding threshold: ordinary hardship and an increased sense of security will not ordinarily suffice.

The claimant appealed against a decision of District Judge Evans dated 23 January 2009 ordering his extradition to France under a European Arrest Warrant. The proceedings arose from a French murder allegation dating from 2002. The claimant had provided information to the British and French authorities and remained in custody in England for other offences until August 2007. The effective warrant was issued in November 2008.

The central issue was whether, having regard to the delay and its effect on the claimant’s circumstances, extradition would be oppressive under sections 11 and 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge had not erred in concluding that extradition would not be oppressive by reason of delay.
2. The court applied Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779: oppression principally concerns hardship resulting from changes in the accused’s circumstances, and the seriousness of the alleged offence is relevant.
3. Following La Torre v Republic of Italy [2007] EWHC 1370 and Government of Croatia v Milan Spanovic [2007] EWHC 1770 (Admin), the court had to make an overall assessment of all the circumstances. The focus was the effect of the passage of time. Culpable delay did not necessarily make extradition unjust or oppressive.
4. The court applied Gomes and Goodyer v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21: oppression is not easily established and commonplace hardship caused by extradition is insufficient.
5. Future delay in France was speculative and immaterial. The relevant inquiry concerned past delay. The period spent in custody in England was significant because extradition could not have occurred during that period. The court nevertheless considered the whole period from 2002 to 2008, giving particular weight to the 15 months after release.
6. Taking the total period, the claimant’s custody, the gravity of the alleged offence and the effects of delay together, oppression was not established. The appeal was dismissed. The court expressed confidence that, if convicted, the claimant would receive credit for his assistance and for the delay.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal from the decision of District Judge Evans dated 23 January 2009. The appeal was dismissed.