Wilson & Anor v Yorkshire Dales National Park Authority

A National Park authority exercising traffic-order powers must comply with the duty in section 122 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The existence of a statutory purpose for making an order does not remove the obligation to balance the statutory traffic objective against the matters specified in section 122(2). That balancing exercise must be undertaken for each order; a general assessment of competing interests is insufficient. Where vehicular rights are unproven, it is irrational to restrict consideration to a total permanent prohibition. The strength of an outstanding modification-order application may be considered, but it is only one factor. Complexity of a proposed restriction is also a relevant consideration, provided it is assessed rationally.

The claimants, representing themselves and members of the Motoring Organisations’ Land Access and Recreation Association, brought a statutory challenge under Part VI of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The challenge concerned traffic regulation orders made by the Yorkshire Dales National Park Authority prohibiting mechanically propelled vehicles on eight unsealed routes.

The claimants alleged, among other matters, failure to comply with section 122, irrational treatment of routes where vehicular rights were unresolved, irrational rejection of limited or seasonal orders, and inadequate reasons. They no longer sought relief concerning four routes. The central issues were whether the Authority had performed the required statutory balancing exercise and whether its approach to unresolved vehicular rights was irrational.

1. Section 122 duty. The duty to secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of traffic operates, so far as practicable, in the light of the matters specified in section 122(2) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Whether those matters are described as primary or secondary is immaterial. The authority must perform the required balancing exercise before making each order.
2. The fact that an order is expedient for preserving amenity or conserving natural beauty under sections 1 or 22 does not absolve the authority from its section 122 duty. Nor can the court assume that a complete prohibition is necessary merely because some form of order is justified.
3. The evidence did not show that the Access Committee had been sufficiently directed to section 122 or had performed the required route-specific balancing exercise. A general balancing of interests and references in background documents were insufficient. The principal ground therefore succeeded and the orders for routes A, B, C and F were quashed.
4. It was irrational to consider only a total permanent order where BOAT status had not been established. The strength of an outstanding application for a definitive map modification order could be taken into account, but only as one factor among others. The court would also have quashed the orders for routes B and C on that ground.
5. Complexity was a relevant factor when choosing between full and limited orders. The Authority’s rejection of the objection on that basis was not irrational in the Wednesbury sense. The challenge based on inadequate reasons also failed because the claimants had shown no relevant prejudice.

Not stated in the judgment. This was a first-instance statutory challenge in the Administrative Court.