Sainsbury's Supermarket Plc, R (on the application of) v Local Government

A challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is confined to ordinary administrative-law grounds. It is not a review of planning merits. Planning policy must be interpreted objectively, by reading its operative text with relevant explanatory text and in context. The weight given to material considerations is for the planning decision-maker. A decision letter need only explain the principal important controversial issues and must be read fairly and as a whole. A precedent objection may be based on evidence of sufficient similarity and cumulative harm; precise sameness is unnecessary. The court may decline to quash where an error would not have materially affected the decision or caused substantial prejudice.

The claimant applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an Inspector’s decision dated 24 July 2008. The Inspector had dismissed the claimant’s section 78 appeal against refusal of permission to extend an existing supermarket in the Barons Quay Development Area, Northwich.

The challenge alleged misinterpretation of Local Plan Policy GS9A, inadequate reasons, irrationality, unfairness and unlawful reliance on precedent. The central questions were whether the Inspector had lawfully treated the proposal as piecemeal development prejudicial to a comprehensive scheme, and whether his reasoning adequately explained that conclusion.

1. The application was dismissed. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs of £8,750.
2. Section 288 provides a challenge on ordinary administrative-law grounds only. It does not permit a merits review. An irrationality challenge must not become a disguised rehearing of planning arguments. The court retains discretion not to quash unless the error materially affected the decision.
3. Policy GS9A was lawfully interpreted. Applying R v Derbyshire County Council ex p Woods, the operative policy was read with the explanatory text in the Local Plan. That text contemplated a single comprehensive scheme and significant redevelopment. The Inspector was therefore entitled to treat development and redevelopment as materially connected for the policy’s purposes.
4. The Inspector’s reasons were adequate when read fairly and as a whole. They identified the principal controversial issues, explained why the proposal was piecemeal, and showed why it might hinder redevelopment, voluntary relocation and, ultimately, a possible compulsory purchase order. The use of “foreclosing” was understood in context as hindering or making the comprehensive scheme more difficult, rather than absolutely eliminating every redevelopment option.
5. The Inspector was entitled to rely on the risk of precedent. The relevant question was one of planning judgment and degree. Evidence of sufficient similarity was required, but exact sameness was unnecessary. The evidence supported the view that allowing the proposal could encourage other town-centre proposals and cumulatively undermine the comprehensive approach.
6. The alleged unfairness failed. The Inspector’s conclusions were permissible inferences from evidence and submissions aired at the inquiry. The challenged observation did not form a critical or significant independent basis for the decision and, in any event, no substantial prejudice was shown. The court therefore found no material breach of fairness or natural justice.

This was a first-instance judicial review claim in the Administrative Court. The court dismissed the section 288 application and ordered the claimant to pay costs of £8,750.