Pluckrose v Snaresbrook Crown Court

A Crown Court has a broad discretion when deciding whether to award costs from central funds after allowing an appeal against sentence. A successful appeal will normally support a defendant’s costs order, but the court may refuse costs where the appeal was allowed despite the appellant’s limited merits, including as an act of mercy. The court should give reasons, although the required standard depends on the circumstances. Judicial review is available only where the decision is unlawful in public law terms, including where the reasons are unintelligible or disclose an error of principle.

The claimant pleaded guilty to a road traffic offence and was disqualified from driving after accumulating 12 penalty points. On appeal to the Crown Court under Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, section 108, the disqualification was removed on the ground of exceptional hardship. The Crown Court nevertheless refused to make a defendant’s costs order under Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, section 16.

The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that the reasons given for refusing costs were erroneous or unintelligible. The central issue was whether the Crown Court had acted unlawfully in exercising its costs discretion.

1. The application was dismissed. The Crown Court had been entitled to refuse a costs order, and its decision was not amenable to intervention on ordinary judicial review principles.

2. Under section 16(3) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, a successful appeal against sentence does not automatically entitle the appellant to costs. The Practice Direction indicated that costs would normally be awarded, but the discretion remained dependent on the circumstances.

3. Applying Cunningham v Exeter Crown Court [2003] EWHC 184 (Admin), the Crown Court should give reasons for refusing costs. One recognised reason is that an appeal was allowed as an act of mercy. That expression was not technical. It described a case in which the appellant succeeded on mitigation despite the underlying merits not being wholly in his favour.

4. The claimant had pleaded guilty, had accumulated 12 penalty points and would ordinarily have been disqualified. The Crown Court accepted his exceptional-hardship mitigation and removed the disqualification. The Recorder’s reference to the guilty plea could reasonably be understood as an assessment of the merits and as conveying that the court had shown mercy. Her initial reference to the absence of an exact costs figure could likewise be understood as indicating that summary assessment was not possible.

5. The adequacy of reasons depends on the circumstances. A brief explanation may suffice where its purpose is clear. On the interpretation available on the accepted account of the hearing, the Recorder’s reasons were not unintelligible and disclosed no error of principle.

6. Lord Justice Pill agreed. He stated that the Crown Court has a broad discretion on costs in appeals involving sentences and associated orders. Judicial review of such an order is limited by whether it falls clearly outside the broad area of the lower court’s sentencing discretion, applying the formulation in R v Truro Crown Court ex parte Adair [1997] COD 296 at 298.

First-instance judicial review proceedings in the Divisional Court. The application was dismissed.