Mack v Lockwood & Ors

The forfeiture rule applies to unlawful killings, including manslaughter. Under Forfeiture Act 1982, s.2, relief requires the applicant first to show that justice requires modification of the rule. The court must focus primarily on the offender’s culpability, assessed by the nature and circumstances of the killing, while also considering the deceased’s conduct and other material circumstances. Criminal-law labels, including partial defences to murder, do not determine the civil application. The financial consequences of forfeiture may be considered, but must not displace culpability as the paramount consideration. Where the killing was deliberate and brutal, and mental impairment explains but does not substantially reduce responsibility, the justice of the case may require no modification of the rule.

The claimant, the husband of the deceased, applied under s.2 of the Forfeiture Act 1982 for relief from the forfeiture rule after pleading guilty to manslaughter on grounds of provocation. He had stabbed his wife repeatedly during a domestic argument. The evidence concerned his claimed belief that she threatened him, his frontal-lobe impairment, the circumstances of the killing, the marital relationship, and the financial consequences of forfeiture.

The deceased’s executor took a neutral position. One son opposed the application and another took no active part. The central issue was whether, having regard to the offender’s conduct, the deceased’s conduct and all other material circumstances, justice required the forfeiture rule to be modified.

1. Statutory threshold and discretion. Section 2(2) of the Forfeiture Act 1982 requires the applicant to establish that, having regard to the offender’s conduct, the deceased’s conduct and other material circumstances, justice requires modification. If that threshold is crossed, the extent of any modification is discretionary.
2. Relevant approach. The forfeiture rule is a public-policy rule, not a rule designed to produce a fair result between the parties. Following Dunbar v Plant [1998] Ch 412 and In Re Land (Deceased) [2007] 1 WLR 1009, the first and paramount consideration is the offender’s culpability for the death. The consequences of applying or modifying the rule may be considered, but must not assume paramount importance.
3. The court hearing the application is not bound by the criminal-law labels or findings associated with a partial defence to murder. It may make its own findings on the evidence. The relevant questions were whether the claimant intended to kill, what caused him to do so, and the extent to which he was blameworthy, taking account of the deceased’s conduct and any circumstances explaining or mitigating his behaviour. The approach was consistent with Reg v Chief National Insurance Commissioner, ex parte Connor [1981] QB 758.
4. The claimant’s frontal-lobe impairment probably contributed to his over-reaction and to his continuing the attack after his wife could no longer pose a threat. It did not, however, significantly reduce his responsibility for the initial deliberate and forceful stabbing. He had not acted defensively, could have withdrawn, and had intended fatal harm. The deceased’s conduct did not justify the killing.
5. The financial consequences did not materially support relief. The claimant was not dependent on his wife, would not be rendered destitute, and the forfeiture would benefit the deceased’s sons rather than remote relatives receiving an unexpected windfall. The application was therefore refused.