Clarke & Anor v Corless & Anor

A constructive trust arising from an informal property venture requires a sufficiently clear express accord, although contractual certainty is unnecessary. The agreement must identify the basic arrangement without a difference of principle, and the claimant must show reliance referable to it. Unconscionable conduct alone is insufficient.

An informal plan to oppose a common owner will not necessarily bind the parties’ consciences in a later acquisition where it was not intended to create legal consequences, was abandoned, or was not relied upon. In an easement dispute, interference is assessed by practical convenience, not necessity, and the court will not decide questions based on theoretical facts. Ambiguous transfer plans may be resolved by admissible extrinsic evidence.

The claimants and defendants owned neighbouring houses in a gated development. The defendants acquired the estate road and part of the western strip from the developer. The claimants alleged that the residents had agreed to acquire and hold the amenity land through a management company, and sought a constructive trust under the principle in Pallant v Morgan.

The claim also concerned use of a turning area, a screw attaching trellis to a fence, and ownership of a boundary wall. The central issues were whether the alleged consensus created an equity and continued to bind the defendants, whether the claim was barred by laches, what use interfered with the claimants’ easement, and how the boundary was to be determined.

1. Constructive trust. The claim for a constructive trust over the amenity land was dismissed. The relevant agreement need not satisfy contractual certainty, but it must be an express accord on the basic details of the arrangement, without a difference of principle. The court may infer that consensus existed from conduct, but it does not impose an agreement on parties merely because of their conduct. Unconscionability is necessary but insufficient; the doctrine also protects parties from unintended legal consequences.
2. The claimants also had to prove reliance referable to the alleged consensus. This commonly involves staying out of the market or incurring expenditure, but the conduct must confer an advantage on the acquiring party or prejudice the claimant’s ability to acquire the property on equal terms. The January 2003 discussions concerned a campaign against the developer and were not intended to create legal consequences concerning acquisition of the land. In any event, the consensus had been abandoned by September 2004 and the claimants had not relied on it.
3. Laches. The defence of laches failed. The delay was not exorbitant and had not made a fair trial impossible. The matters relied on as prejudice mainly supported the substantive conclusion rather than establishing laches.
4. Turning area. The claimants’ easement permitted use of the whole turning area. The test for interference was whether the right of way could be substantially and practically exercised as conveniently as before, rather than whether use was necessary. The planning condition was relevant but not determinative. The court declined to grant declarations concerning hypothetical use, because the evidence did not establish particular circumstances of interference.
5. Other issues. The screw claim was treated as disproportionate. The claimants were entitled to a declaration that the brick boundary wall belonged to South Heath. The transfer plans were ambiguous under the general boundaries rule in section 60 of the Land Registration Act 2002, but the topographical evidence and the wall’s alignment supported that conclusion.