PNPF Trust Company Ltd (Pilots' National Pension Fund, trustee of) v Taylor & Ors

Under CPR r. 19.2(2), joinder is desirable where it is necessary to resolve the matters in dispute, assessed through the overriding objective. A person with the same interest as existing representative defendants may nevertheless be joined where the court cannot be satisfied that representation against that person’s expressed wishes would be fair. Representation without consent is legally possible, but the court must balance efficiency, proportionality, delay, cost and equality of arms against the person’s interest in conducting its own case and being bound directly by the result. Article 6 does not confer an absolute right to direct access where representative access is adequate.

The claimant trustee brought Part 8 proceedings concerning the construction of a pension scheme and statutory provisions, including the scope of its powers to impose additional contributions to address a substantial deficit. Teesport, an active self-employed pilot authority with a significant potential liability, applied to be joined as a defendant so that it could be represented by its own lawyers.

The claimant and other defendants opposed joinder. They relied on proposed interest-based representation, including representation by Bristol, with which Teesport had a community of interest. The central issue was whether Teesport’s presence was desirable under CPR r. 19.2(2) when it could be represented under CPR r. 19.7, but objected to being represented against its will.

1. Application granted. Teesport was joined as a defendant under CPR r. 19.4. It would conduct its own case and be bound by the outcome.
2. Under CPR r. 19.2(2), the court’s wider discretion arises once joinder is desirable in order to resolve all matters in issue. Desirability involves a value judgment informed by the overriding objective.
3. Under CPR r. 19.7(2)(d)(ii), a representation order may be made where persons have the same interest in the claim and representation would further the overriding objective. The power remains discretionary. Consent is not a requirement, and representation against a person’s wishes is legally possible.
4. The historical authorities show that representative procedures are intended to make justice practicable, not to exclude a person who is willing to appear and protect his own interests. The modern rules require the court to consider all relevant circumstances without adding a gloss to their terms.
5. Teesport and Bristol had a community of interest. Differences in commercial circumstances, competing commercial interests and preferences about how arguments should be presented did not prevent that conclusion.
6. Article 6 did not require direct access to the court. Access through a representative, even one not chosen by the person represented, can satisfy the Convention. However, the Article 6 authorities did not determine the domestic discretion whether to join Teesport.
7. The court accepted the efficiency and proportionality of the proposed representative structure and the risks of additional cost, delay and applications by other parties. Those factors had substantial weight. They did not, however, outweigh Teesport’s expressed wish to be heard through its own lawyers and to be unconditionally bound by the proceedings.
8. Post-judgment safeguards, including the need for permission to enforce against a non-party under CPR r. 19.7(7)(b), could generate satellite litigation and were not an adequate substitute for deciding the representation issue at the outset. Fairness therefore required joinder on the facts of this case.
9. The decision was fact-sensitive. The court emphasised that fairness and the overriding objective must be assessed in each case.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.