Ridley, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food & Rural Affairs

In a statutory challenge to a definitive map decision, an inspector may assess documentary and user evidence cumulatively. Individual items need not independently establish dedication or the status of a public right of way if, taken together, they reasonably support the conclusion reached.

A reviewing court will not re-evaluate the evidence or interfere merely because an inspector’s description of evidence is imprecise, provided the reasoning is intelligible and lawful. An irrelevant representation need not receive specific mention. Costs decisions based on late evidence are similarly reviewable only on established public-law grounds.

Two claims arose from an inquiry into the proposed upgrading of a public footpath in Somerset. The first was a statutory challenge under paragraph 12 of Schedule 15 to the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 to the Inspector’s decision confirming the route as a bridleway. The claimants alleged misunderstanding of evidence, perversity and failure to consider a representation.

The second claim sought judicial review of costs decisions requiring Mr Ridley and Mrs Masters to pay costs caused by an adjournment after substantial material was produced shortly before the resumed inquiry. Permission had previously been refused on the papers, and renewal was sought orally.

1. Statutory challenge. The challenge to the Order Decision was dismissed. The available grounds corresponded to ordinary judicial-review grounds.
2. The alleged mischaracterisation of the Order Making Authority’s comments did not invalidate the decision. The reference to the Council’s comments in the final decision was more naturally understood as referring to its comments on the Parish Council minutes, rather than to the earlier description of the meaning of “UCR”. In any event, the words “often” and “possibly” were imprecise expressions and did not establish that the Inspector had misunderstood the evidence.
3. The conclusion that the route had bridleway status was not perverse. Consistently with the approach summarised from Jones v Bates [1938] 2 All ER 237, the Inspector was entitled to infer dedication and acceptance from the evidence as a whole. The fact that no individual item independently established dedication did not prevent an accumulation of material pieces of evidence from doing so. Assessing the significance and possible confusion in the Parish Council minutes was pre-eminently a matter for the Inspector.
4. The alleged failure to consider Mrs Masters’s letter was also rejected. The Inspector had received it, but it offered no assistance as to the contents of the unidentified land-charge record relevant to this case. It was irrelevant and required no special mention.
5. Costs decision. The renewed application for permission to seek judicial review was refused. It was open to the Inspector to regard the late production of extensive evidence as unreasonable, notwithstanding earlier service of a document described as a skeleton argument. The Inspector had expressly considered that document and concluded that it was inadequate to enable preparation for the later evidence.
6. Costs were ordered in favour of the Secretary of State in both claims on the standard basis, subject to an agreed £1,400 set-off relating to unnecessary bundle preparation in the statutory challenge.

High Court (Administrative Court): The statutory challenge was dismissed. The renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review of the costs decisions was refused.

Earlier procedural stage: Irwin J had refused permission on the papers on 2 July 2008.