Thomas (t/a RT Properties) v National Assembly for Wales & Anor

In a planning appeal, an inspector must give reasons on each principal important controversial issue identified as central to the applicant’s case. A general statement that all evidence was considered is insufficient where the decision does not explain why a material argument was rejected. A failure to give adequate reasons justifies quashing where it causes prejudice.

An inspector has jurisdiction to determine whether deemed advertisement consent exists if an application for express consent is framed to raise that issue. The inspector has no free-standing duty to investigate deemed consent where the applicant has not requested that determination, particularly on a weak evidential basis.

The claimant applied under the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) Regulations 1992 for express consent to retain a large illuminated advertisement. The local planning authority refused consent on visual amenity and public safety grounds. On appeal, the inspector dismissed the appeal.

The claimant sought judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. He argued that the inspector had failed to address evidence that a substantially similar advertisement had stood in the same location for many years without objection. He also argued that the inspector should have determined whether deemed consent existed under regulation 6 of the 1992 Regulations.

1. Reasons. The guidance in Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 71 P&CR 309 required the inspector to address the principal important controversial issues. On a fair and objective reading of the written representations, the history, similarity and previous lack of objection to the earlier advertisement formed a central part of the claimant’s case under regulation 4 of the 1992 Regulations.
2. The inspector made no express reference to that issue. The phrase that he had taken account of all the evidence did not provide sufficient reasoning. The claimant could not understand why the present advertisement was objectionable when a virtually identical sign had existed without objection for a substantial period. Prejudice was therefore established, and the decision was liable to be quashed.
3. Deemed consent. The 1992 Regulations should be interpreted as permitting a local planning authority, and an inspector on appeal, to determine whether deemed consent exists where an application for express consent is framed to raise that question. The absence of an express procedure was a lacuna, not an indication that the issue had to be determined exclusively under sections 191 and 192 of the 1990 Act.
4. That jurisdiction did not impose a duty to determine deemed consent without a request by the applicant. The claimant had not asked the inspector to decide the issue, and the assertion that an advertisement might have existed for about 40 years was too flimsy to trigger such a duty. The second ground therefore failed.
5. The inspector’s decision was quashed on the first ground, and the appeal was to be re-determined.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The inspector’s decision was quashed and the appeal was to be re-determined.