Bown v Bristol City Council

Standing under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 requires an objectively recognisable interest in the planning outcome. The relevant categories include the planning-process appellant, a person who took a sufficiently active role, such as a substantial objector, and a person with a relevant interest in the land. An employee of the decision-making authority who participated in the process and disagrees with the resulting decision does not qualify merely because he alleges illegality by his employer. The statutory standing requirement is not widened to permit challenges by persons lacking a personal interest in the outcome.

The claimant sought an order under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash a woodland Tree Preservation Order made by Bristol City Council in respect of Grove Wood.

The claimant had been employed by the council as an Arboricultural Officer. He had investigated the tree-felling issue, exercised delegated powers concerning trees on the site boundary and later expressed strong opposition to the woodland order. He had not objected to the order in a private capacity, had no legal or equitable interest in the land and did not live nearby.

The court determined as a preliminary issue whether he was a person who was “aggrieved” and therefore entitled to bring the claim.

1. The claim was dismissed because the claimant was not entitled to bring proceedings under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

2. The court treated Eco-Energy (GB) Ltd v First Secretary of State, [2004] EWCA Civ 1566, as binding authority. The relevant categories of persons aggrieved are the appellant in the planning process, someone who took a sufficiently active role in that process, probably a substantial objector, and someone with a relevant interest in the land.

3. The claimant did not fall within the first or third categories. Although he had played an active role as an employee of the council, that role was part of the decision-making process itself. It was not the type of active participation contemplated by the Court of Appeal, which concerned a substantial objector unconnected with the actual decision-making process.

4. The claimant’s disagreement with his employer’s decision, including his proposed allegation of illegality, did not create the necessary interest. Section 288 requires an objectively recognisable interest in the outcome. Permitting a council employee in the claimant’s position to challenge the order would extend standing beyond the category intended by Parliament as interpreted by the higher courts.

5. The court therefore dismissed the claim. The defendant’s application for costs, limited to £5,000, was to be considered after written representations from the claimant.

First-instance decision. The judgment stated that any appeal should be pursued by an appellant’s notice seeking permission from the Court of Appeal within 21 days.