Shiekh v The General Dental Council

On a statutory appeal from a professional disciplinary decision, the High Court must correct material errors of fact or law but accord substantial respect to the specialist tribunal’s assessment of the sanction required in the public interest.

Professional sanctions are not primarily punitive. They protect the public, maintain confidence in the profession and uphold professional standards. The tribunal must consider the individual circumstances, mitigation and proportionality, but may conclude that erasure is necessary despite the absence of direct risk to patients where serious dishonesty has seriously damaged public confidence.

The appellant, a dentist and owner of several practices, appealed under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 against the Professional Conduct Committee’s decision to erase his name from the register. His fitness to practise impairment and criminal conviction for conspiracy to defraud the NHS were admitted. The appeal concerned sanction only.

The appellant argued that the Committee had disregarded the passage of time, repayment, charitable work, good character and his continuing provision of dental services; misunderstood the risk to the public; failed to appreciate its powers concerning suspension; and treated the General Dental Council’s guidance as prescriptive. The central issue was whether the Committee had erred in law so as to justify appellate interference.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Committee had correctly understood that sanctions were directed principally to protecting the public, maintaining public confidence in the profession and maintaining professional standards. The purpose was not retribution. This approach was consistent with Fatnani and Raschid v General Medical Council [2007] 1 WLR 1460 and the public-confidence principle discussed in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512.
2. The Committee had considered the relevant mitigation. It took account of testimonials, charitable work, community assistance, previous good character, repayment and the appellant’s subsequent professional activities. It was entitled to conclude that these matters did not outweigh the need to maintain public confidence.
3. There was no legally material error in the Committee’s reference to risk. The absence of direct risk to patients did not prevent erasure where the conduct had seriously damaged public confidence in the profession. The Committee’s reference to possible conditions concerned whether they would protect confidence and professional standards, not an asserted indirect risk of physical harm or further fraud.
4. Under section 27B(6) of the Dentists Act 1984, the Committee could impose suspension for no more than 12 months. The possibility that a later committee might review or extend suspension under section 27C(1) did not enlarge the power available to the Committee deciding the case. The Committee was entitled to conclude that suspension did not meet the seriousness of the misconduct.
5. The General Dental Council guidance was not determinative or impermissibly prescriptive. It expressly required each case to be considered on its own merits. The Committee had applied that approach, considered proportionality and the effect on patient care, staff and the appellant, and was entitled to order erasure. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, summarily assessed at £20,000.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): statutory appeal under section 29 of the Dentists Act 1984 against the Professional Conduct Committee’s erasure decision. Appeal dismissed and costs ordered.