Perrins v Holland & Anor

Testamentary capacity is task-specific and must be assessed in the context of the particular testator, estate and potential beneficiaries. The Banks v Goodfellow criteria require understanding of the act and its effects, the extent of the property, and the claims to which effect ought to be given. They involve a commonsense judicial assessment of all the evidence, not a purely medical question.

Where a testator with capacity gives accurate instructions for a will but later lacks capacity, the will may still be valid under the principle in Parker v Felgate if the testator believes that the executed will gives effect to those instructions and it does so. Separate proof of knowledge and approval at execution is unnecessary in such a case, although the court may nevertheless find that knowledge and approval existed.

Robert Perrins challenged the validity of his father’s will dated 26 September 2001. The will left the estate, principally a bungalow, to Anne Dooney, described as Robert’s carer, with a substitutionary gift to his son David and brother John if Anne failed to survive him.

The claim alleged that Robert lacked testamentary capacity when he gave instructions on 5 April 2000 and when he executed the will. The court considered medical, social-services and lay evidence, the distinction between testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval, and the application of the principle in Parker v Felgate.

1. The claim to invalidate the will failed. The court pronounced in favour of the will dated 26 September 2001.

2. The governing test was that in Banks v Goodfellow. It required assessment of whether Robert understood the nature and effects of making a will, the extent of his property, and the claims to which he ought to give effect. The assessment was a commonsense judicial judgment on the whole evidence. Medical evidence could assist, but the criteria were not themselves purely medical questions. Testamentary capacity was task-specific and had to be considered in the context of the particular testator and estate.

3. Robert had testamentary capacity when he instructed Mr Ferguson on 5 April 2000. His conversation showed that he could identify his principal asset, understand his family relationships, answer hypothetical and conditional questions, and weigh competing claims.

4. Robert lacked testamentary capacity on 26 September 2001. The court relied particularly on evidence of serious short-term memory, abstraction and concentration difficulties, contemporaneous confusion and inability to make decisions, and evidence of cognitive deficits.

5. Nevertheless, Parker v Felgate applied. The will accurately embodied Robert’s earlier instructions, those instructions remained his testamentary wishes, and Robert understood when executing the document that he was executing the will for which he had given instructions. It was unnecessary that he recall the instructions in detail or understand every clause independently.

6. The court further found that the contents had been briefly summarised to Robert and that he understood the summary. It therefore found knowledge and approval of the contents, while observing that separate proof might not be required where the Parker v Felgate principle applies.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision was stated in the judgment.