Deeb v General Medical Council

The court’s jurisdiction under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983 is confined to terminating an interim suspension, revoking or varying interim conditions, or substituting the period of an extant order. It does not permit the court to review historic interim orders where no suspension or conditions remain in force. A challenge to the original decision or to its review should instead be brought by judicial review. An Interim Orders Panel considers whether the allegations and available information justify interim protection. It does not determine the truth of the allegations or resolve conflicts in evidence. Where the practitioner knew of the hearing, the panel may proceed in the practitioner’s absence even if the evidence bundle was not supplied.

Dr El Deeb sought to challenge interim orders made by the General Medical Council’s Interim Orders Panel in February and July 2008. The first order suspended his registration for 18 months. The second replaced suspension with conditions. A later panel revoked the conditions in March 2009.

He challenged the investigation, the evidence relied upon, the conduct of the hearings, and the refusal to disclose information. He sought to quash the earlier orders and obtain further relief, including compensation. The central issues were whether the Administrative Court had jurisdiction under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983, and, if so, whether the panel decisions were legally flawed.

1. The application was treated as one under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983, although there is no ordinary right of appeal against an Interim Orders Panel decision. The statutory powers are limited to terminating an interim suspension, revoking or varying interim conditions, or substituting the period of an extant order.

2. Because the March 2009 panel had revoked the conditions and no suspension or other interim order remained in force, the court had no jurisdiction. A challenge to the original order, or to a failure to review it properly, should have been brought by judicial review. The court could not quash historic orders, direct prosecution of third parties, remove material from the GMC’s files, or award compensation.

3. In any event, the decisions disclosed no public-law error. Under [2007] EWCA Civ 369, an Interim Orders Panel is concerned with whether the allegations, rather than their ultimate truth, justify interim protection. It need not determine credibility or resolve conflicts in evidence. The February panel had before it apparently credible concerns from a consultant’s report, a patient’s statement, admissions concerning an email photograph and a consultation in a supermarket, and the termination of Dr El Deeb’s hospital employment.

4. The panel was entitled to proceed in Dr El Deeb’s absence. The relevant rules required service of the hearing notice, not necessarily prior delivery of the complete bundle. Dr El Deeb knew of the hearing and had not sought an adjournment. The panel was therefore entitled to conclude that reasonable efforts had been made to serve him.

5. The July review panel was also entitled to confine the hearing to review of the interim order rather than determine the truth of the allegations. The court could not substitute its assessment of the merits for that of the panel. The appeal was dismissed. The GMC was awarded costs of £6,970.60.

This was a first-instance application in the Administrative Court. The judgment describes earlier Interim Orders Panel decisions but identifies no lower court judgment.