D & MD Williams v Rhyl County Court

Judicial review of a County Court decision is reserved for truly exceptional cases. A decision that is wrong in law, fact, or both does not ordinarily justify intervention. The claimant must show that the judicial process itself was frustrated or corrupted, including a substantial denial of a fair hearing, a pre-existing jurisdictional defect, or a complete failure to perform an unequivocal judicial duty. In adversarial litigation, a party who advances a positive defence bears the evidential responsibility of obtaining supporting evidence. Fresh evidence is generally admitted only where it could not have been obtained earlier with reasonable diligence. A high threshold applies at the permission stage.

The claimants sought permission to bring judicial review proceedings against decisions made in a road traffic claim in Rhyl County Court. The County Court had found liability for a tractor collision to be equally shared and entered judgment against the claimants. Their appeal and renewed application for permission to appeal were refused by HH Judge Farmer QC, principally because proposed fresh evidence could have been obtained before trial and offered no real prospect of success.

Permission for judicial review was initially refused by HH Judge Gilbart QC. The claimants renewed the application before the Administrative Court, alleging procedural unfairness, inadequate notice, and corruption of the judicial process.

1. Permission refused. The claimants had not shown a reasonable prospect of succeeding in judicial review and had not surmounted the exceptionally high threshold applicable to review of County Court decisions.
2. Following R on the application of Strickson v Preston County Court and Others [2007] EWCA Civ 1132, the relevant distinction was between a judge merely reaching an incorrect decision and circumstances in which the judicial process itself had been frustrated or corrupted. The latter category was truly exceptional and could include substantial denial of a fair hearing or a failure to perform an unequivocal duty to inquire or adjudicate.
3. The documents relied upon did not establish any plot between the opposing party, the insurers, and the County Court to prevent representation. The judge therefore declined to express any view on whether the original refusal of an adjournment was correct, since ordinary error was insufficient for judicial review.
4. Judge Farmer was entitled to apply the usual rule that fresh evidence should be admitted only where it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been obtained earlier. The claimants had raised the issue that the tractor was not driven on their behalf, so it was for them to seek evidence supporting that defence before the adverse decision. Their later attempt to obtain evidence from Gwyn Evans did not demonstrate frustration or corruption of justice.
5. The absence of a skeleton argument from the opposing party did not materially alter the position. The May 2008 order was permissive, and the fresh-evidence rule was one which the judge was likely to apply in any event.

1. Rhyl County Court: the district judge found liability for the road traffic accident to be equally shared and entered judgment against the claimants.
2. Rhyl County Court, HH Judge Farmer QC: the renewed application for permission to appeal was refused. The proposed fresh evidence had been available at trial, was of questionable reliability, and disclosed no real prospect of success or compelling reason for permission.
3. High Court (Administrative Court): HH Judge Gilbart QC initially refused permission for judicial review. On renewal, HH Judge Jarman QC again refused permission.