A v Leicester City Council & London Borough of Hillingdon

A local authority’s duty under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 to a looked-after child cannot be ended unilaterally because the child moves elsewhere or expresses a wish to live in another area. The authority must first conduct a proper and rigorous assessment of the child’s welfare needs, age, understanding, wishes and feelings, and the accommodation required. The duty may continue even after that assessment if the child’s welfare requires further services. Where two authorities are involved, their duties may be concurrent. Disputes about responsibility or funding must not delay provision. Authorities should co-operate, make interim arrangements and resolve recoupment or resource issues afterwards.

The claimant, an unaccompanied Somali asylum seeker, was accommodated by Hillingdon under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. She moved to Leicester to live with Somali family friends and consistently refused to return to Hillingdon. Hillingdon treated the move as ending its responsibilities and referred her to Leicester. Leicester assessed her as a child in need but maintained that Hillingdon remained responsible.

The claimant sought judicial review of both authorities’ failure to provide continuing accommodation, support and an adequate care plan. The central issues were whether Hillingdon had lawfully discharged its section 20 duties, whether Leicester owed a concurrent duty, and whether responsibility could be deferred pending resolution of the authorities’ dispute.

1. Hillingdon’s duties. Hillingdon had not lawfully discharged its section 20 duty. Its age assessment and other documents were principally descriptive. They did not provide a proper analysis of the claimant’s needs, a future strategy, or a sufficiently detailed plan identifying the services required, who would provide them and when.

2. Assessment before ending the duty. A child’s wishes and feelings are not automatically decisive. Under section 20(6), they must be given due consideration within an overall assessment of welfare needs, age, understanding, and the type and location of accommodation required. Hillingdon had treated the claimant’s wish to remain in Leicester as determinative without carrying out that assessment.

3. The section 20 duty endures until a proper assessment has taken place and may survive it where the child’s welfare requires continuing services. The duty is not coercive, but it must be brought to an end lawfully. A child’s unilateral move, even where the child is Gillick competent, does not itself terminate the duty.

4. Meaning of provision. The expression “provided with accommodation” in section 22(1) concerns accommodation made available or provision made for the child through the authority’s social services functions. It is not confined to the child’s actual physical receipt of accommodation at a particular location.

5. Concurrent duties and inter-authority disputes. Both authorities owed concurrent duties on the facts. Leicester should not have refused support or attempted to pass responsibility back to Hillingdon. Authorities must meet the child’s needs first, make an interim plan, and resolve questions of funding or recoupment afterwards. They should use co-operation and, where appropriate, coordinated reviews rather than leave the child between two authorities.

6. The court granted declarations that Hillingdon had acted unlawfully, that its identified practice was unlawful, that the claimant remained a looked-after child, and that Hillingdon had failed lawfully to discharge its duties. Leicester had also failed to discharge its concurrent section 20 duty. The question of any contribution between the authorities was deferred to a further hearing.

This was a first-instance judicial review. The judgment refers to permission being granted against Leicester and, on renewal, against Hillingdon, but no earlier judgment in the claimant’s proceedings is stated.