Alcock, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board

A prisoner whose Parole Board hearing has been delayed may establish a breach of European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(4), but that does not ordinarily entitle him to jump the queue or obtain an order requiring priority over other prisoners.

The Administrative Court should avoid designing the Parole Board’s allocation of limited resources or second-guessing its listing policy. Priority may be justified by very special circumstances, but a merely strong case for release is insufficient. Where a declaration would confer no practical benefit and suggest unjustified exceptionality, it may properly be refused. A damages claim requires proof of a compensable loss and cannot be established merely by showing delay.

The claimant was a serving life prisoner whose tariff had expired and whose case had been assessed as suitable for an oral Parole Board hearing. His case remained unlisted despite repeated listing exercises. The Parole Board accepted at the hearing that the delay amounted to a breach of European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(4).

The claimant sought a declaration, an order requiring the Board to list his case on the next suitable date, priority over other prisoners, and damages. The central issues were whether the Board’s listing and prioritisation policy was lawful, whether the claimant’s circumstances justified priority, and what relief should follow from the admitted breach.

1. The Article 5(4) breach. The claimant had not received the speedy hearing before an independent judicial body required by European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(4). The Board’s concession on that issue was correctly made.
2. Lawfulness of the listing policy. The Board’s system considered the merits at the initial ICM stage, directed cases with a realistic prospect of release to an oral hearing, and allowed special circumstances to justify expedition. It was neither improper nor irrational to avoid repeated detailed paper assessments of the relative merits of all cases awaiting listing. The court would not design how the Board should allocate its limited judicial and administrative resources.
3. Priority and judicial intervention. The claimant’s case was strong but not overwhelming. It did not involve the very special circumstances required to justify placing him ahead of prisoners who were not before the court and whose circumstances were unknown. The guidance in R (James) v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] UKHL 22 and the reasoning in R (on the application of the Betteridge) v Parole Board [2009] EWHC 1638 (Admin) supported restraint in granting such relief.
4. Relief. A formal declaration was refused because it would provide no demonstrable practical benefit and might give the claimant an unwarranted badge of exceptionality. The claim for damages was dismissed because no damages claim had been established. The judicial review claim was otherwise made subject to no order. The claimant’s publicly funded costs were to be assessed, with the defendant paying costs up to 1 July 2009 and no order for costs thereafter. Permission to appeal was refused.

Not stated in the judgment.