Bolger, R (on the application of) v Surrey Valuation Tribunal & Anor

Judicial review is not an alternative route for challenging a valuation tribunal’s factual assessment. Where a statutory appeal is available on a point of law, judicial review remains confined to public-law errors, such as jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness amounting to a breach of natural justice. Mere disagreement with the tribunal’s evaluation of evidence, comparable properties or factual conclusions is insufficient. The court cannot substitute its own view of the facts for that of the specialist tribunal.

The claimant sought judicial review of a decision of the Surrey Valuation Tribunal dated 27 March 2000, which retained his property in council tax Band F. He contended that the property should be placed in Band E and challenged the tribunal’s reliance on comparable sales, the description of the property and house-price indices.

A statutory appeal to the High Court on a point of law was available under the Council Tax (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) Regulations 1993, but the claimant proceeded by judicial review. The central issue was whether his complaints disclosed an arguable public-law error rather than disagreement with factual findings.

1. Application refused. The claimant had not shown an arguable error of public law.

2. Under regulation 32 of the Council Tax (Alteration of Lists and Appeals) Regulations 1993, a right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law existed, subject to the statutory time limit. The claimant’s choice to proceed by judicial review did not enlarge the court’s supervisory jurisdiction.

3. Judicial review could lie for jurisdictional error or procedural error amounting to a breach of natural justice. It could not be used merely because the claimant disagreed with the tribunal’s factual assessment. The tribunal was entitled to prefer the listing officer’s sales evidence, attach little weight to regional house-price indices and assess the property by reference to its rooms and comparable transactions.

4. The complaints concerned factual comparisons and the weight given to evidence. They were therefore outside the public-law issues suitable for judicial review, and the court could not impugn the tribunal’s decision simply because it might have reached a different factual conclusion.

5. The second defendant was awarded £500 towards the costs of preparing its acknowledgment of service and summary grounds of defence. The sum was agreed as an alternative to detailed assessment.

The judgment records that the claimant’s renewed application followed refusal on paper by Charles J. The present court refused the judicial review application.