RSPCA v Johnson

A certificate under section 31 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 is conclusive evidence of the certified date, subject only to exceptional cases such as fraud or a defect apparent on its face. The court may investigate abuse of process, but it must not ordinarily conduct a general inquiry into when information came to different officers. The prosecutor is the prosecuting corporate body. Knowledge does not necessarily arise when any employee receives relevant material; it involves an opportunity for appropriately skilled officers to consider whether the evidence justifies proceedings. Prosecutors may not delay proceedings by passing papers between officers or sitting on information. Reasonable investigation, including obtaining authoritative evidence and allowing expert consideration, is not abuse of process.

The RSPCA appealed by way of case stated from a decision of Consett Magistrates’ Court. The Deputy District Judge refused to hear an information alleging an offence under section 4(1) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, holding that it was out of time.

The RSPCA relied on a certificate stating that sufficient evidence had come to the prosecutor’s knowledge on 21 December 2007. The principal issues were whether the certificate complied with section 31, who was the prosecutor, when the relevant knowledge arose, and whether the court could go behind the certificate on abuse-of-process grounds.

1. Appeal allowed. The certificate was valid on its face and conclusive under section 31(2) of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, subject to the recognised exceptions for fraud, or a certificate plainly inaccurate or defective on its face. The use of “possession” instead of “knowledge” did not invalidate it, and the signature showed that Mr Fletcher acted on behalf of the RSPCA.
2. The prosecutor for section 31 purposes was the RSPCA, not Mr Fletcher personally. Nevertheless, knowledge did not arise automatically when any employee obtained relevant information. The statutory concept allowed a degree of judgment and involved an opportunity for officers with appropriate skills to assess whether the evidence justified prosecution. The prosecuting authority could not manipulate time by passing papers between officers or failing to address the issue.
3. The court approved the approach in Morgans v the DPP [1999] 1 WLR 968, R v Haringey Magistrates’ Court, ex parte Amvrosiou (1996) EWHC Admin 14 and Burwell v the DPP (2009) EWHC 1069 Admin. The certificate provisions were exceptions to the ordinary six-month limit and required strict construction, but they preserved a margin of judgment for the prosecutor.
4. The RSPCA’s investigation was not an abuse of process. The inspector made substantial efforts to trace the respondent and then sought authoritative ownership evidence. Delay was materially contributed to by the respondent’s evasiveness. There was no rule that knowledge began immediately when an employee had relevant information, and the period between 10 and 21 December 2007 did not establish abuse.
5. The matter was to proceed according to further submissions concerning the appropriate course below. The successful appellant received its costs of the appeal.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by case stated was allowed. The Magistrates’ Court’s refusal to hear the information was set aside, with the subsequent course to be determined after further submissions.
• Consett Magistrates’ Court: The Deputy District Judge refused to hear the information, treating it as out of time.