B v Wolverhampton Youth Court

Apparent bias is determined by asking whether, having regard to all relevant circumstances, a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. A magistrate is not automatically disqualified because she taught at a school previously attended by a defendant, or because she had dealt with a member of the defendant’s family. The circumstances must be assessed as a whole, including the absence of any personal dealings. Failure to explain fully why information was requested may be unsatisfactory, but it does not itself establish apparent bias. Disqualification is a legal consequence of the objective test, not a discretionary case-management decision.

The claimant, aged 15, sought judicial review of the Wolverhampton Youth Court’s refusal to set aside his conviction for taking a pedal cycle without consent and order a retrial before a differently constituted bench. The chairman had taught at a school previously attended by the claimant and recognised his name, but had never taught him or otherwise dealt with him. The claimant argued that the circumstances created an appearance of bias, particularly because the reason for an earlier request for the school’s name was allegedly not disclosed. The central issue was whether the circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the youth court was biased.

1. Application refused. The court upheld the youth court’s refusal to set aside the conviction or order a new trial.
2. The applicable test was whether, having ascertained all the circumstances bearing on the allegation, a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased. The court adopted the formulation stated in AWG Group Ltd v Morrison [2006] 1 WLR 1163.
3. Disqualification for apparent bias was not discretionary. The court had to make its own assessment of the relevant circumstances and decide whether the objective test was satisfied.
4. A magistrate was not automatically barred from hearing a case merely because she had taught at a school attended by the defendant. Nor was previous contact with a member of the defendant’s family ordinarily an automatic bar. The significance of such circumstances depended on the particular facts.
5. Here, the chairman had recognised the claimant’s name but had neither taught him nor had any personal dealings with him. On the justices’ account, the relevant information had been disclosed to the claimant’s solicitor before the hearing, leaving it to the solicitor to take instructions and apply for recusal if appropriate. Even on the solicitor’s different account, the failure to explain why the school’s name was requested, or the claimant’s earlier lack of knowledge that the chairman was a teacher there, did not create apparent bias.
6. The court therefore concluded that a fair-minded and informed observer would not find a real possibility that the youth court had been biased. It was unnecessary to resolve the dispute between the accounts of what had been said. The court added that legal advisers should make a contemporaneous note of disclosures by justices intended to be communicated to the defendant’s advocate.

• Wolverhampton Youth Court: On 27 June 2008, refused the application to overturn the conviction and direct a new trial before a differently constituted bench.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Refused judicial review and upheld the youth court’s decision.