Johnson v State Prosecutor at the Tribunal De Grande Instance De Lille France

For an accusation European arrest warrant to satisfy section 2(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003, the warrant itself must unequivocally state that the person is sought for the purpose of being prosecuted. The court begins with the warrant and ordinarily should not investigate matters outside it where the required information is clear. A warrant is defective only where, read as a whole, it leaves unclear whether extradition is sought for prosecution or merely for questioning. Differences between French and English criminal procedure must be recognised, and the warrant should be construed broadly to facilitate extradition. A separate letter explaining likely post-return procedure does not create ambiguity where the warrant itself clearly seeks surrender for prosecution.

Paul Johnson and Martin Stevens appealed under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge Evans’s orders for their extradition to France. Each European arrest warrant concerned prosecution for complicity in organised drug importation and the importation of prohibited goods.

The appellants argued that the warrants failed to comply with section 2(3)(b) because their introductory wording did not unequivocally state that they were sought for prosecution. They relied on the wording considered in Thompson v Public Prosecutor of Boulogne Sur Mer and on a letter explaining the French procedure, submitting that extradition was sought only for preliminary questioning.

1. The appeals were dismissed. The warrants, read as a whole, unequivocally sought the appellants’ arrest and extradition for criminal prosecution and therefore complied with section 2(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. The introductory wording was unclear because it did not remove one of the alternatives between accusation and conviction warrants. That defect did not determine the issue. The detailed descriptions of the alleged offences and circumstances showed that the warrants were accusation warrants relating to forthcoming proceedings.
3. The court applied the principle that the starting point is the warrant. Where it contains the required information, it is unnecessary and generally inappropriate to go behind it or permit the extradition proceedings to become occupied by contested expert evidence. There must, however, be an unequivocal statement that the purpose is prosecution.
4. Thompson v Public Prosecutor of Boulogne Sur Mer was distinguishable. There, the warrant contained a procedural passage indicating that the preliminary investigation remained in progress and that the person had not been placed under formal examination. That ambiguity justified doubt whether prosecution was the purpose. No comparable ambiguity appeared in these warrants.
5. The letter from the French authorities concerned the bail and detention consequences of return. It summarised French procedure and did not suggest that the appellants were wanted for questioning only. The court also recognised the need to read extradition legislation in its cultural and procedural context rather than solely through the lens of English criminal procedure.
6. District Judge Evans may have placed excessive emphasis on the assumption that surrender cannot be sought merely for questioning, but he had considered the relevant authorities and reached the correct conclusion. Johnson was granted detailed assessment of his publicly funded costs.

• High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge Evans ordered the extradition of both appellants on 26 May 2009. The High Court dismissed both appeals under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003.