Gidden v Chief Constable of Humberside

[2009] EWHC 2924 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2009] EWHC 2924 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
29 October 2009
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Criminal procedure Service of notice of intended prosecution
Keywords
notice of intended prosecution first-class post 14-day time limit rebuttable presumption postal service Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 speeding case stated appeal
Outcome
appeal allowed; conviction set aside
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Where a notice of intended prosecution is sent by first-class post, service is presumed to occur in the ordinary course of post, but that presumption is rebuttable. The defendant may prove that the notice was actually delivered outside the statutory 14-day period.

The irrebuttable deeming provision in section 1(2) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 applies to registered post and recorded delivery, but not first-class post. Courts cannot expand that provision to cure the practical difficulties caused by postal delay.

Factual background

The appellant was convicted of speeding. The notice of intended prosecution was sent by first-class post within time, but was delivered 16 days after the alleged offence. The prosecution accepted the late delivery.

The Crown Court dismissed the appeal, holding that service was effective because delivery would ordinarily have occurred within 14 days. On appeal by way of case stated, the Divisional Court had to determine whether first-class posting in those circumstances satisfied sections 1(1)(c), 1A(c) and 1(3) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

Held

  1. Appeal allowed. The notice of intended prosecution was not properly served and the conviction was set aside.
  2. Section 1(1)(c) requires service within 14 days. Under section 1A(c), first-class post is an authorised method of service, but the provisions do not themselves determine when service occurs.
  3. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act creates a rebuttable presumption that postal service occurs when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. First-class post was ordinarily delivered on the second working day after posting. The presumption was rebutted by the accepted evidence that delivery occurred 16 days after the offence.
  4. Section 1(2) creates an irrebuttable deeming provision where the notice is sent by registered post or recorded delivery. Its wording does not extend that protection to first-class post. Section 1(3) likewise leaves the defendant able to prove non-compliance.
  5. R v Appeal Committee of County of London Quarter Sessions, Ex parte Rossi [1956] 1 All ER and Beer v Davies [1958] 2 QB 187 supported the distinction between actual delivery and posting before the statutory deeming provision was introduced. Groome v Driscoll [1969] 3 All ER 1638 and Nicholson v Tapp [1972] 1 WLR 1044 were consistent with the construction adopted.
  6. Any perceived anomaly or inconvenience caused by postal strikes was for Parliament to address. The court could not distort clear statutory language to assist prosecuting authorities. Costs were ordered out of central funds, to be assessed.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Crown Court at Great Grimsby: dismissed the appeal against conviction and held that service was effective despite delivery 16 days after the alleged offence.
  2. High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal by way of case stated and set aside the conviction.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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