Sheikh & Anor v Dogan & Ors

A judge may reconsider an oral judgment after delivery but before the consequential order is sealed only for strong reasons, and the jurisdiction is reserved for exceptional cases. It does not permit a party to re-argue points already made, introduce points that could have been made before judgment, or avoid the consequences of judgment by making a new application. The proper route for alleged legal error is an appeal. Finality is an important consideration: parties should know whether they remain parties to the proceedings, and orders should ordinarily be drawn up after judgment.

The court had previously allowed the first four defendants’ applications to strike out the claimant’s claims in two related actions. Before the consequential orders were sealed, the claimant sent written submissions asking the judge to reconsider the decision, amend or transfer pleadings, stay execution, grant permission to appeal, and delay sealing pending proposed recusal and other applications.

The judge considered whether the jurisdiction recognised in Re Barrell Enterprises [1973] 1 WLR 19 permitted those further submissions and whether there were sufficient grounds to revisit the judgment.

1. The application to reconsider the judgment and the related requests to delay sealing or stay execution were refused. There were no strong reasons to reconsider the decision.

2. The reference to CPR 42.1 was mistaken. CPR 40.2(1) was the likely intended provision, but it did not itself confer the relevant jurisdiction. Under Re Barrell Enterprises [1973] 1 WLR 19, a judge may reconsider a judgment delivered before the consequential order is sealed, but should exercise that power only for strong reasons. The successful party should ordinarily be able to treat an oral judgment as valid and effective.

3. The jurisdiction does not permit a party to re-argue points already addressed or advance points that were not argued before judgment. This limitation had been reiterated in Paulin v Paulin [2009] EWCA Civ 221. The practice of writing to a judge to seek reconsideration was deprecated in Egan v Motor Services [2007] EWCA Civ 1002.

4. The claimant had not misunderstood the procedural status of the actions. Her proposed transfer of the pleading in one action into another was inappropriate because the issues in an action should appear in that action’s own statements of case. Re-arguing the adequacy of the particulars, including reliance on McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] 3 All ER 775 at 792, did not justify reconsideration.

5. The proposed amendment, stay, recusal-related applications and other proposed proceedings could not be used to avoid the delivered judgment. In any event, further particulars would not overcome the separate ground that the causes of action had been compromised by a settlement agreement relied upon by the claimant. The correct route for an alleged error of law was an appeal, not a faxed application to change the judge’s mind. Final orders were therefore to be drawn up.

This was a first-instance decision concerning written submissions made after an earlier extempore judgment in the same proceedings. The court had already struck out the claims against the first four defendants on 10 November 2009; this judgment refused the claimant’s attempt to reopen that decision before the consequential order was sealed.