Toropdar v D

Contributory negligence by a child is assessed by the standard reasonably expected of a child of the same age, intelligence and experience, not an adult standard. The court must then make a just and equitable apportionment by weighing the parties’ relative blameworthiness and the causative effect of their conduct. Relevant factors include the child’s age and manner of entering the road, the driver’s speed and precautions, the opportunity to avoid the collision, and the potentially destructive disparity between a motor car and a pedestrian. A driver must take particular care where children may be present and visibility is obstructed. On the facts, the child’s contributory negligence was assessed at one-third.

The claimant sought a declaration that he was not liable for injuries suffered when his car struck D, a ten-year-old boy, in Cable Street, Hackney. At an earlier hearing the court held that the claimant was negligent. The present hearing concerned whether D was contributorily negligent and, if so, the appropriate apportionment.

D had run rapidly into the road from behind a bus without stopping or looking. The claimant was travelling within the speed limit but too fast for the conditions, without precautionary braking, in an area where children and pedestrians were likely to be present. The central issue was the just and equitable reduction attributable to D’s conduct.

1. Child standard. D was old enough to be expected to take precautions for his own safety. His conduct had to be judged by the standard reasonably expected of a child of the same age, intelligence and experience, rather than that of a reasonable adult. D was at fault in running into the street without stopping or looking, but his youth reduced the degree of blame attributable to him.
2. Apportionment. Under the statutory apportionment principle, the court must evaluate the parties’ relative blameworthiness and the causative effect of the acts and omissions constituting negligence. Authorities on different facts provide limited guidance. The assessment requires all relevant factors to be weighed, including the child’s age, activity and manner of entering the road, the driver’s speed and precautions, and the opportunity available to avoid the accident.
3. Driver’s responsibility. The claimant should have adjusted his speed and used precautionary braking when approaching an obstructed area beside a bus stop in an inner-city residential street where children were likely to be present. A motor car’s capacity to cause serious injury means that the standard of care expected of its driver is generally higher than that expected of a pedestrian. The claimant’s failure to take the required precautions was causative, even though D emerged suddenly and gave him little time to react.
4. Result. D’s conduct was directly causative and involved substantial blameworthiness, but he was only ten and the claimant’s driving fault was substantial. The cases involving reductions of 70 or 75 per cent were materially different because the drivers’ speeds were lower and the children were older. The just and equitable reduction for D’s contributory negligence was one-third.