Secretary of State for the Home Department v AM

In a review of a non-derogating control order, the court must decide for itself whether there are reasonable grounds for suspecting terrorism-related activity. The decision whether a control order and each obligation remain necessary requires proportionality analysis, with appropriate deference to the Secretary of State on national-security assessments.

Article 6 requires sufficient information about the allegations to enable effective instructions. Closed material may be considered only where that standard is met. Obligations must be no more intrusive than necessary and should be tailored to their purposes.

The Secretary of State sought review under section 3(10) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 of a control order imposed on AM in June 2007 and renewed in 2008 and 2009. Earlier modification appeals had altered some obligations, and disclosure issues had been considered in prior proceedings.

The central issues were whether there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that AM had been involved in terrorism-related activity; whether continuing control was necessary; whether the allegations and closed material afforded a fair hearing; and whether individual obligations were proportionate.

1. The court held that its tasks under section 3(10) were to determine for itself whether there were reasonable grounds for suspecting terrorism-related activity and whether a control order and its obligations were necessary. The first question was objective. The second required proportionality, while allowing due deference to the Secretary of State’s national-security assessments.

2. The gist of the core allegations gave AM sufficient information to provide effective instructions, satisfying Article 6. The court found that AM was Ismail, had been contacted by AY on telephone 235 for terrorism-related purposes, and that the contact concerned instructions connected with the transatlantic airline plot. There were overwhelming reasonable grounds for suspicion and continuing control was necessary.

3. The court rejected arguments based on improper delegation, ulterior purpose and unfair disclosure. The Secretary of State had made the final decisions, and the court was satisfied that no material obtained by torture supported the core case.

4. Each obligation had to be no more intrusive than necessary. The midnight-to-8am curfew remained justified, but its weekly relaxation was varied to 4am once every four weeks. Visitor approval remained necessary, although the Home Office could require only information reasonably needed for identification and monitoring.

5. The restrictions on visits to the family home remained justified. The requirement that visitors switch off and surrender mobile phones was removed. The specific prohibition on associating with Y was deleted because the material available to the court did not support it. An appropriately limited exception was ordered for AM to keep and use an Xbox solely for games without internet access.

The judgment records earlier modification and disclosure proceedings, including an appeal by the Secretary of State against an order of Sullivan J concerning disclosure. The appeal was dismissed. The present judgment was a section 3(10) review, not an appeal from those decisions.