N (A Child), Re

A court may make an order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 where repeated private-law litigation is harming a child, even if the parents have agreed to the order or one parent promises not to bring further applications. The order may properly bind both parents where that is necessary to protect the child. Its duration must reflect the history and likely impact of the litigation; mathematical precision is not required. Expiry of the order does not itself justify a further application. The court may continue to scrutinise and summarily dismiss an unmeritorious application or one contrary to the child’s best interests.

The judgment concerned outstanding applications by the mother and the child’s guardian for an order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989. The parents had been involved in prolonged and highly antagonistic private-law proceedings concerning the child. The father initially opposed any order, asserting that he would make no further applications, but subsequently agreed to a four-year order. The mother and guardian sought a longer period. The matter was decided on the papers by agreement, with the central issues being whether an order was required, whether it should bind both parents, and its appropriate duration.

1. The court held that this was an exceptionally clear case for a section 91(14) order. The continuing litigation had caused significant stress and emotional harm to the child. The order was essential to protect his welfare and to prevent renewed litigation.

2. The order properly applied to both parents. Although the father’s litigation misconduct was more serious, the mother was not blameless and both parents bore responsibility for the existing situation. Equal restraint was necessary to protect the child effectively.

3. The father’s assurances that he would not litigate did not remove the need for an order. His previous conduct gave the court no sufficient confidence that those assurances would remain reliable, and his later acknowledgment that he might apply concerning the child’s Bar Mitzvah was inconsistent with his earlier position.

4. The order was fixed for four years, until after 25 November 2013. Two years would provide inadequate protection, while the court regarded four years as a reasonable period in the circumstances. The court was not bound by the parties’ proposed periods and emphasised that the duration of a section 91(14) order cannot be determined by artificial mathematical precision.

5. The order prohibited either parent from making any application for an order under the Act concerning the child without leave of a judge of the Family Division. It excluded applications concerning specified financial matters. The child ceased to be a party and the guardian’s appointment consequently lapsed.

6. Expiry of the order would not itself justify a new application. The court would retain power to summarily dismiss an unmeritorious application or one not in the child’s best interests, and would be likely to require a genuinely material change of circumstances. The court also warned that disputes about important religious arrangements were generally better resolved within the relevant community than through further family litigation.