Fielden v Bradford Crown Court

On a renewed application for permission to seek judicial review of a refusal to state a case, the court should consider whether the proposed appeal would have any real prospect of success. No useful purpose is served by requiring a case to be stated where the proposed grounds are futile, misconceived, hopeless or academic.

Under section 20(4)(b) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, conditions attached to an approval are express conditions. Guidance in a manufacturer’s installation manual does not become an implied condition merely because the equipment was approved. A court may rely on photographic evidence of speed calculated from successive photographs, independently of radar evidence. An alleged error in reasoning does not justify relief where the court’s conclusion demonstrates that the correct criminal burden and standard of proof were applied.

The claimant was convicted by a magistrates’ court of exceeding a 30-mile-per-hour speed limit. Her appeal to Bradford Crown Court was dismissed, and the Crown Court refused to state a case on 27 proposed grounds, treating the application as frivolous under rule 64(7)(6) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005.

Munby J refused permission on the papers. The claimant renewed the application before the Divisional Court, challenging the admissibility and reliability of radar evidence, the photographic evidence, the burden of proof, corroboration, alleged procedural errors, costs, and proposed fresh evidence. The central question was whether any proposed appeal by way of case stated had a real prospect of success.

1. Outcome. The renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review was refused. The Crown Court had given adequate reasons for refusing to state a case, and any appeal by way of case stated would have been doomed to failure.
2. Approval conditions. Section 20(4)(b) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 refers to conditions subject to which approval was given. Those words refer to express conditions. The Crown Court was entitled to reject the submission that compliance with the manufacturer’s installation manual was an implied condition of Home Office approval. DPP v Carey [1970] A.C. 1072 provided some assistance, but it was unnecessary to go beyond the statutory wording.
3. Reliability of the measurements. The Crown Court was entitled to conclude that the radar reading was reliable. The radar beam operated over a straight section of road, so the later curvature of the road was immaterial. The evidence also supported the speed calculated from the photographs. The court added that the conviction could have been based solely on that photographic evidence.
4. Burden and corroboration. Any earlier reference by the Crown Court to the claimant bearing the burden of proving erroneous radar readings had no practical effect. Its concluding words showed that it was satisfied so that it was sure that the device was accurate and that the claimant exceeded the limit. Section 89(2) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 did not apply because the conviction was not based solely on one witness’s opinion of speed; it involved radar evidence and calculations from photographs.
5. Other grounds. The court declined to decide the hypothetical abuse-of-process argument concerning prosecution below an alleged enforcement threshold. The proposed fresh evidence, including recorded telephone conversations, did not demonstrate an arguable error of law, excess of jurisdiction or irrationality. The Crown Court’s costs order was not shown to be unlawful or unreasonable.

• Magistrates’ Court: The claimant was convicted after trial of exceeding the speed limit.
• Bradford Crown Court: The appeal was dismissed. The Crown Court refused to state a case on the proposed grounds.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Munby J refused permission on the papers. The Divisional Court refused the renewed application.