Leeside International Inc & Anor, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets

[2009] EWHC 325 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2009] EWHC 325 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
2 March 2009
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Public law Compulsory purchase
Keywords
compulsory purchase order Town and Country Planning Act 1990 section 226 material considerations officer’s report planning judgment alternative remedy public inquiry
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A local authority may use compulsory purchase powers under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 226, where the statutory development and well-being conditions are satisfied. The authority’s decision must be based on a fair summary of material facts, but it need not reproduce the full history of negotiations where the landowners understood the dispute and suffered no real disadvantage. Evidence that a large development will take several years to complete does not establish implementation uncertainty where the developer has planning permission, a settled intention to proceed and the ability to do so. A public benefit offered in connection with the acquisition need not itself be located on the acquired land if the statutory planning justification is independently established.

Factual background

The claimants held long leasehold interests in properties at Heron Quays. They challenged the defendant local authority’s decision to authorise a compulsory purchase order under section 226 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, intended to facilitate a major redevelopment by the interested party.

They alleged that the officers’ report misstated the history of negotiations, failed to address uncertainty about implementation, and failed to explain that the proposed training and enterprise centre might be provided outside the development. The defendant and interested party denied those errors and relied alternatively on the statutory objection and public inquiry process.

Held

  1. Claim dismissed. Permission to proceed was refused.
  2. The description of the claimants as unwilling to sell except at a substantial premium was fair. The negotiations had established a wide and persistent valuation gap. The claimants knew that compulsory purchase was under consideration and were not taken by surprise or placed at a real disadvantage. It was therefore unnecessary for the officers’ report to set out every detail of the negotiations, provided that Cabinet received a fair summary enabling an informed judgment. The court applied the approach in Oxton Farms v Selby District Council [1997] EG 60.
  3. There was no material uncertainty about implementation. The developer had planning permission, had made substantial efforts to assemble the site, had resolved to proceed and had the established record and resources to implement the scheme. The planning report’s reference to the development taking several years concerned the emergence of mitigation requirements, not the developer’s ability or intention to implement the scheme.
  4. The statutory justification did not depend upon the training and enterprise centre being constructed within the acquired land. The wider economic, social and environmental benefits of the redevelopment independently satisfied section 226. The possibility that the centre might instead be provided nearby was neither legally material nor a material consideration requiring specific attention.
  5. Had it been necessary to decide the alternative-remedy issue, the court would have refused relief because the statutory objection and public inquiry procedure was the appropriate forum for disputed facts, interpretation and planning judgment. The court referred to R v Camden LBC ex parte Comyn Ching & Co (London) Ltd [1984] 47 P & CR 417.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

First-instance judicial review claim. No appellate decision is stated in the judgment.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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