Secretary of State for the Home Department v Saadi

A court reviewing a control order must reach its own decision on whether the evidence provides reasonable grounds for suspicion. Previous findings by another tribunal may be checked for consistency, but they cannot be used as building blocks for the court’s conclusion. The question is whether the evidential matrix, assessed as a whole, justifies reasonable suspicion; it is not a conventional finding of fact according to a single standard of proof.

Continuing necessity requires a current assessment. Long periods without terrorism-related activity, together with the diminishing utility of restrictions and the passage of time, may mean that a control order is no longer necessary. Extremist views or contact with persons regarded as extremists will not, without more, justify indefinite restrictions where the content of the contact discloses no terrorism-related activity.

The Secretary of State sought confirmation of a non-derogating control order imposed on the respondent under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The order had originally been made in April 2008 and renewed in March 2009. The respondent had previously been detained, released on bail by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, and made subject to control-order restrictions.

The Secretary of State relied on alleged historic involvement in terrorism-related activity, including activity connected with a Milan-based group and contacts with al-Qaeda-linked individuals. The respondent disputed the allegations and relied on the absence of any terrorism-related activity since March 2002, the passage of time, and the impact of the restrictions on his family life. The central issues were whether the original and renewed decisions were flawed, whether continuation remained necessary, and whether the obligations were proportionate.

1. Reasonable suspicion. The court applied the approach in Home Secretary v MB (2006) EWCA Civ 1140. It had to determine for itself whether the evidential matrix amounted to reasonable grounds for suspicion. It was not bound by the findings of SIAC and could not treat them as building blocks, although it had to check its conclusions against them and explain any significant difference. The court found reasonable grounds for suspecting that the respondent had attended a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and had played a prominent role in the Milan group’s terrorism-related activity.
2. Original order. In light of the historic material, and allowing appropriate weight to the Secretary of State’s and Security Service’s assessment of necessity, the original control order was not flawed. The alleged prison drawing and the DVDs added little or no weight.
3. Continuing necessity. The last alleged contact with the Milan group was in March 2002. There had been no subsequent terrorism-related activity, and the respondent’s contacts with named individuals regarded as extremists were not shown to concern terrorism-related activity. The passage of time, the substantial absence of concerning conduct during detention and bail, and the diminishing utility of prolonged restrictions materially weakened the case for continuation. The respondent’s continuing disaffection and extremist sympathies did not, without more, justify indefinite control-order restrictions.
4. The guidance in SSHD v AT and AW [2009] EWHC (Admin) 512 was relevant, but the present case had to be decided on its own facts. The court concluded that the control order was no longer necessary and ordered that it be revoked.
5. The judicial-review challenge to the making of the orders was rejected. The Secretary of State had not been materially misled. Although the original order inaccurately stated that the respondent was currently involved in terrorism-related activity, the decision had in fact been based on historic activity and future risk, and the court declined to quash it. The challenge to the restriction on pre-arranged meetings would have succeeded, but became academic because the control order was revoked.

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and the Court of Appeal concerning deportation, but this was a section 3(10) hearing in the Administrative Court.