Andresen & Anor v Lovell

Harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 requires conduct amounting to a course of conduct and a sufficient basis for apprehending further harassment. An isolated historical incident, a single innocuous visit, and past communications that had ceased did not establish that basis. An injunction obtained without notice may be set aside where the applicant has failed to give full and frank disclosure of material facts, including facts affecting urgency and the existence of any continuing threat. The court may strike out a claim that discloses no viable cause of action.

Jenny Andresen sought an injunction against her uncle, Paul Lovell, under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Her allegations included a disputed incident nearly 20 years earlier, a brief visit to business premises, communications concerning a disputed sum of money, and alleged conduct connected with websites about her mother’s businesses.

An interim injunction had been granted without notice and continued in the defendant’s absence. The defendant applied to set it aside for material non-disclosure and to strike out the claim or obtain summary judgment. Anne Andresen was later joined as a second claimant, but the court had not yet heard her application for relief. The issues included whether the first claimant disclosed a cause of action and whether the without-notice injunction should stand.

1. The first claimant’s claim was struck out and the injunction granted on 17 August 2009 was set aside. The claim disclosed no sufficient cause of action based on harassment.
2. Section 1(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 prohibits pursuing a course of conduct amounting to harassment where the defendant knows or ought to know that it amounts to harassment. Section 3(1) provides the civil remedy for an actual or apprehended breach. The statutory scheme requires more than an isolated act and a proper basis for apprehending future harassment.
3. The alleged incident nearly 20 years earlier was treated, for present purposes, as potentially giving rise to a triable issue. It was nevertheless a one-off event, raised only much later, and could not justify an urgent without-notice injunction in 2009. The brief visit to the business premises could not amount to harassment in itself. The historic allegation concerning the second claimant was also immaterial to the immediate question concerning the injunction.
4. The defendant’s website postings were described as spiteful and irresponsible, and might potentially have supported relief for the second claimant on an appropriate cause of action if a real and continuing threat had been established. They did not, however, establish harassment of the first claimant.
5. An applicant seeking without-notice relief bears a heavy duty of full and frank disclosure. The first claimant failed to disclose material matters, including the defendant’s true reason for leaving the jurisdiction, the misleading account of his wedding, and the fact that the websites had already been taken down or rendered inactive. The injunction was therefore properly set aside for non-disclosure or lack of frankness.
6. The court did not determine the second claimant’s separate application for an injunction. It considered it desirable for the parties to avoid contact except where necessary for genuine family or financial matters.