Stojak, R (on the application of) v Sheffield City Council

An application for judicial review must be brought promptly and, in any event, within the period prescribed by Civil Procedure Rules Part 54.5. Pursuing a complaint before the Local Government Ombudsman does not ordinarily justify delaying judicial review proceedings, particularly where the Ombudsman cannot quash or set aside the decision under challenge. The court may refuse to extend time where delay has caused, or is likely to cause, factual prejudice. Even where an arguable public law issue exists, permission may be refused where the claim lacks sufficient general importance to justify proceedings brought long after the impugned decision.

The claimant sought judicial review of Sheffield City Council’s refusal to reimburse or reconsider charges incurred in providing care to his late mother between 1991 and 2002. She had been detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and subsequently lived in a nursing home. The claimant became aware of the possible section 117 issue in 2006 and pursued the Council’s complaints procedure and a complaint to the Local Government Ombudsman. The Ombudsman’s final decision was issued in March 2009, and the claim was lodged in June 2009. The central issue was whether time should be extended under Part 54.5 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

1. Permission refused. The court declined to extend time and refused permission to proceed with the judicial review.
2. Part 54.5 of the Civil Procedure Rules required the claim form to be filed promptly and, in any event, within three months after the grounds first arose. The Council’s position had been clear by 2007, and the claimant’s decision to pursue the Ombudsman’s process did not suspend or extend the judicial review time limit.
3. The Ombudsman’s investigation was not a sufficient reason for delay. The Ombudsman had no power to set aside the Council’s decision. Legal advisers contemplating judicial review should therefore consider issuing proceedings close to the decision under challenge, even if an Ombudsman complaint is also pursued. The court relied on R v Education Committee of Blackpool BC ex p Taylor [1999] ELR 237.
4. The court considered that the underlying section 117 argument was arguable in principle, following the clarification associated with R v Manchester CC ex p Stennett [2002] 2 AC 112. That did not overcome the delay. The passage of time had created substantial evidential prejudice because relevant officers were unavailable and the factual question concerning the services required in 1991 would be difficult to establish.
5. The claim also did not raise a matter of sufficient general importance to justify judicial review so long after the decision. The court accordingly refused to exercise its discretion to extend time.

Not stated in the judgment.