Cardiff County Council, R (on the application of) v The Welsh Ministers

Residential accommodation under section 21(1)(a) of the National Assistance Act 1948 may cease to be provided under that provision even though a person’s care needs remain unchanged. The court must examine how those needs are met and whether accommodation and care have become disaggregated. A change from arranged residential accommodation to an independently held tenancy may break the link with the original section 21 provision, leaving care to be provided under other statutory powers. On judicial review, the court reviews the legality and rationality of the determining authority’s decision and does not substitute its own view. A dispute between authorities over funding did not require a finding on legitimate expectation where the individual’s care would continue unaffected.

Cardiff County Council challenged a determination by the Welsh Ministers under section 32(3) of the National Assistance Act 1948. The determination held that the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ceased to be responsible for funding EK’s care when, after living in residential accommodation arranged by that authority, she moved into a tenancy of a flat owned by a housing association in Cardiff. Cardiff contended that the original section 21 accommodation continued because EK’s care needs and support arrangements had not materially changed. It also alleged irrationality, misinterpretation of the statutory scheme, breach of disability rights, failure to recognise legitimate expectation and inadequate consultation. The central issue was whether EK continued to be provided with residential accommodation under section 21(1)(a).

1. Claim dismissed. The Welsh Ministers were entitled to determine that EK was no longer provided with residential accommodation under section 21(1)(a) of the National Assistance Act 1948.
2. The statutory scheme distinguishes between the provision of residential accommodation and the provision of care. The fact that care needs remain constant does not establish that residential accommodation continues to be provided under section 21(1)(a). The relevant question is how the needs are met. Moving from arranged residential accommodation to a tenancy in ordinary housing could break the chain of provision and disaggregate accommodation from care.
3. The decision had to be read as a whole and in a common-sense manner. Although isolated wording suggested that EK’s need had changed or that accommodation was otherwise available, the determination sufficiently showed that the Welsh Ministers considered the need for accommodation to have changed while the need for care remained. That reasoning was not irrational, unreasonable or legally erroneous.
4. The construction of section 21(1)(a) in Abdul Wahid v The Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Tower Hamlets and Regina (Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support Service did not require a different result. Residential accommodation can include ordinary housing, and care may qualify even where it could be provided in a person’s own home. Those principles did not prevent a finding that the accommodation component had ceased when EK acquired her own tenancy.
5. Section 26 did not apply because the property was not managed by either local authority and was not a registered care home. The disability-rights complaint also failed. The applicable Welsh guidance supplied a sufficiently clear framework for assessing needs under sections 21 and 29 of the 1948 Act and section 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970.
6. The Welsh Ministers were not required to determine legitimate expectation in an inter-authority funding dispute where EK’s care would remain at least at its existing level. The consultation complaint also failed: the authorities knew EK wished to remain in Cardiff with TP, and explaining the detailed funding consequences was not required in the circumstances. Costs submissions were directed within 14 days.