Tesco Stores Ltd v Teignbridge District Council & Ors

A planning permission notice must contain a summary of the authority’s reasons for granting permission and a brief summary of the relevant development-plan policies. The summary need not give full reasons, but it must address the principal issues. This is especially important where members reject an officer’s recommendation to refuse permission and where the decision departs from development-plan policies. No separate proof of prejudice is required, although prejudice is relevant to the court’s remedial discretion. A defective notice is not automatically void, but the usual remedy may be to quash the permission where the omission prevents proper understanding of the decision.

The claimant sought judicial review of the defendant local planning authority’s grant of planning permission for a supermarket, petrol filling station and associated works. The authority’s officers had recommended refusal because the proposal conflicted with employment-land policies and had not been shown to be the most sequentially favourable retail site. The committee nevertheless granted permission. The decision notice contained inaccurate policy references and reasons. The committee later confirmed and amplified reasons at a further meeting. The central issue was whether the reasons complied with article 22 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995 and, if not, what remedy the court should grant.

1. Claim allowed. The grant of planning permission was quashed. The claimant’s costs were awarded against the defendant, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.
2. Article 22 of the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995 required the decision notice to include a summary of the reasons for granting permission and a summary of the relevant development-plan policies. It did not require full reasons, but the principal issues had to be addressed in sufficient terms to show why permission was granted.
3. The requirement was particularly important because the committee had rejected its officers’ recommendation for refusal. The reasons needed to engage, however briefly, with the employment-land conflict, the resulting shortfall in provision, the prospect of the allocated land being developed for employment, the absence of alternative provision, and the sequential comparison between the competing retail sites.
4. Under section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, the development plan had statutory priority, although material considerations could justify a departure. The decision-maker retained planning judgment, but had to identify and properly interpret the relevant policies. The reasons were important in enabling an interested person to understand whether that statutory priority had been observed.
5. A failure to give adequate reasons did not automatically invalidate the permission. The court retained a discretion, and proof of prejudice was unnecessary, although prejudice was relevant. Here the reasons remained inadequate even after the later committee meeting. They did not identify the relevant policies, particularly ST20 and E4, or deal adequately with the principal issues. Quashing was therefore the appropriate remedy.

The judgment states that permission to seek judicial review was granted initially by HHJ Mole QC and generally on renewal by Burnett J. The present court allowed the claim and quashed the planning permission. Permission to appeal was refused, although time was extended for an application to the Court of Appeal.