Stanley v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Ors

Temporary planning permission under paragraph 45 of ODPM Circular 01/2006 requires consideration of three matters: unmet need, absence of available alternative sites, and a reasonable expectation that new sites will become available at the end of the proposed period. If the third condition is not satisfied, the obligation to consider temporary permission is not triggered. Even where it is triggered, the authority retains a discretion. An Inspector may refuse temporary permission where the development causes substantial harm to a protected landscape, conflicts with development plan policies, and a temporary period would undermine the conclusion that the location is unacceptable. These are matters of planning judgment, provided that the Inspector considers relevant personal, accommodation, educational and human-rights consequences and gives adequate reasons.

The claimant, a Romany gypsy, challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 an Inspector’s refusal of permanent and temporary planning permission for a mobile home and residential use on land within the High Weald Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. The challenge concerned only temporary permission.

He argued that the Inspector should have considered a period longer than three years, had failed to address the risk of roadside homelessness, unsuitable alternative accommodation and disruption to the children’s education, and had not adequately explained the refusal. The central issue was whether the Inspector had misapplied paragraph 45 of ODPM Circular 01/2006 or failed to give lawful and adequate reasons.

1. The application was dismissed. The Inspector’s decision was lawful and adequately reasoned.
2. Paragraph 45 of ODPM Circular 01/2006 requires affirmative answers to three questions before consideration of temporary permission is required: whether there is unmet need; whether there are no available sites in the area; and whether there is a reasonable expectation that new sites are likely to become available at the end of the proposed period. On the evidence, the Inspector was entitled to find that the timing and availability of future sites could not reasonably be anticipated. The third question therefore had to be answered negatively, so the obligation was not triggered.
3. In any event, paragraph 45 requires consideration of temporary permission, not its grant. The Inspector was entitled to refuse it because the proposal harmed the AONB, conflicted with landscape-protection policies, and was contrary to the Circular’s approach to gypsy sites in protected landscapes. A period of grace could send a mixed message and undermine the finding that the site was unacceptable.
4. The Inspector had considered alternative accommodation, the possibility that the family would have to leave the site, the children’s educational needs, personal circumstances and the human-rights implications. Those matters were for his planning judgment. The protection of the AONB could not, on his findings, be achieved by a less interfering measure.
5. The uncertainty surrounding future site provision and the harm caused by a longer permission adequately explained why no temporary period, including one longer than three years, was granted.

First-instance judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The judgment does not state any subsequent appellate history.