Barrett v Director of Public Prosecutions

For the purposes of the Road Traffic Act 1988, whether a place is a road depends on its legal status, physical character and public accessibility. The question whether a place is a road is logically anterior to the question whether the public has access to it. A private site may nevertheless contain a road where there is a defined route with ordinary road characteristics, used by members of the public to travel between points. A public footpath is a highway and therefore falls within the statutory definition of road, even if it lacks the width or surface normally suitable for vehicles. The absence of a vehicular through-route or a dedicated destination car park does not prevent a roadway from being a road.

The claimant appealed by case stated from his conviction by Haverfordwest Magistrates’ Court on 17 May 2007 for driving while disqualified. The preliminary issue was whether tarmacadam roadways within a privately owned caravan park at Tenby were roads within the meaning of section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

The site had open gates, a public footpath to the beach, and roadways with defined edges, markings, signs and speed humps. The claimant accepted that the site was a public place but argued that it was a private destination rather than a road. The central issue was whether the Justices were entitled to conclude that the roadway constituted a road for the purposes of the Act.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Justices’ question was answered in the affirmative. An order for costs was made.

2. Whether a place is a road under section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is a question of fact and circumstance for the tribunal of fact, properly directed in law. The statutory definition includes any highway and any other road to which the public has access.

3. The question whether the place is a road is logically anterior to the question whether the public has access to it. A private car park will generally not be a road because it does not provide access from one point to another and lacks the normal characteristics of a road.

4. The roadway in this case was a road in the ordinary sense. It was a tarmac route with defined edges, markings and signs, and was used by members of the public, including people with no other business in the caravan park, to reach the beach. The fact that users had to leave their cars within the park and continue on foot did not alter that conclusion.

5. The public footpath through the caravan park was a highway. It therefore fell within the statutory definition of road. Its highway status was also a proper factor for the Justices to take into account, even though the claimant was seen driving beyond the part of the roadway coterminous with the footpath.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal by case stated dismissed. The Justices’ conclusion that the caravan-park roadways were roads under section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 was upheld.
• Haverfordwest Magistrates’ Court: The claimant was convicted on 17 May 2007 after pleading guilty following the ruling on the preliminary legal issue.