Carroll v Director of Public Prosecutions

Being drunk and disorderly under Criminal Justice Act 1967, section 91(1), requires proof that the defendant was drunk, was in a public place, and was guilty of disorderly behaviour. “Drunk” has its ordinary meaning and is determined as a question of fact. Voluntary consumption of alcohol is the relevant mental element. Disorderly behaviour requires no mens rea. The question is whether the conduct was objectively disorderly, also determined as a question of fact. Specific drunken intent and recklessness are immaterial, although the circumstances may show that conduct was not accidental.

The claimant appealed by way of case stated against his conviction by Gateshead Justices on 2 April 2008 for being drunk and disorderly, contrary to section 91(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. He had been drunk in a public place and had run into, and rolled over the bonnet of, a stationary car. The Justices found that he had acted recklessly, but not with a specific intention to collide, and convicted him because the conduct was not accidental. The central issue was whether recklessness or a specific drunken intent was required, and whether the conduct constituted disorderly behaviour.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Justices were correct to convict, although it was unnecessary for them to find that the claimant had acted recklessly.
2. Section 91(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 creates a basic offence requiring proof of three elements: the defendant was drunk, was in a public place, and was guilty of disorderly behaviour.
3. As to drunkenness, “drunk” bears its ordinary and natural meaning. Whether a defendant was drunk is a question of fact. Following Neale v E (A MINOR) (1983) 80 Crim App R 20, voluntary consumption of alcohol supplies the requisite mental element. If that consumption results in drunkenness, the first element is established.
4. Disorderly behaviour requires no mens rea. It is assessed objectively and the phrase bears its ordinary and natural meaning. Specific drunken intent and recklessness are therefore irrelevant to the legal test.
5. The prosecution and the Justices had proceeded on the mistaken basis that it was necessary to prove that the claimant had acted deliberately or recklessly rather than accidentally. That error did not assist the appeal because the Justices had found, on the facts, that running into the road while larking about with friends was not accidental and objectively amounted to disorderly behaviour.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On an appeal by way of case stated, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction by the Gateshead Justices.