Benacre Estates Company & Anor v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors

A planning decision letter must be read fairly and as a whole. It is sufficient if an informed reader can understand the decision, the principal controversial issues, and how they were resolved. Minor errors or imperfect wording do not invalidate the decision where they cause no material ambiguity or substantial prejudice.

Under Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, s 38(6), the decision-maker must first consider the development plan and then assess whether material considerations justify a different result. In renewable-energy cases, landscape harm and the benefits of renewable energy may be balanced as part of that exercise. Landscape character and visual impact may be assessed compositely where the decision-maker has addressed both matters in substance.

The claimants applied under s 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an Inspector’s decision granting planning permission for two wind turbines and associated infrastructure near Kessingland, Norfolk.

They alleged that the Inspector misunderstood local planning policies, failed to consider landscape character separately from visual impact, and misdirected himself on Government renewable-energy policy. The central issue was whether the decision letter adequately identified and resolved the relevant planning policy conflicts and material considerations.

1. Application dismissed. The Inspector’s decision letter was adequate for its purpose and gave sufficient reasons on the principal issues.
2. A decision letter must be read fairly and as a whole, rather than with excessive legalism or forensic scrutiny. Applying South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter (No.2) [2004] UKHL 33 and Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment at East Staffordshire District Council, the question was whether the letter left genuine, rather than forensic, doubt about what had been decided and why. Minor mistakes did not create material opacity or substantial prejudice.
3. The Inspector had correctly identified the relevant local-plan policies. His statement that he disregarded the requirements for an overriding national need and the absence of an alternative site meant that he gave no weight to those elements insofar as they conflicted with national policy. He had not rewritten the policies or exceeded his jurisdiction.
4. The statutory sequence under s 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 was not inverted. The Inspector considered the development-plan policies first, then weighed renewable-energy benefits and other material considerations, and concluded that they justified departing from policies resisting intrusive development.
5. The Inspector was not required to use the separate expression landscape character in each passage. Read as a whole, the letter addressed both landscape and visual impact, including the effect on the AONB, and reached a composite planning judgment informed by the evidence and site inspections. This approach was consistent with R (Newsmith Stainless Ltd) v Secretary of State for Environment [2001] EWHC Admin 74.
6. The Inspector’s reconciliation of landscape harm with renewable-energy policy was a planning judgment, not a legal misdirection. The key question under PPS 22 was whether the environmental impacts could be addressed satisfactorily in the circumstances of the particular site. The three grounds therefore failed.