Y v London Borough of Lambeth

An appeal from a specialist educational-needs tribunal is concerned with errors of law, not a rehearing of the evidence. A tribunal must give sufficient reasons to explain its conclusions and permit legal scrutiny, but need not address every submission exhaustively. Specialist expertise may be used to choose between evidentially supported courses, provided it is not substituted for evidence without giving the parties an opportunity to respond. The statutory duty to specify educational provision permits a degree of flexibility. A tribunal must not delegate its decision or use vague terms, but it need not prescribe every detail. Where alternative placements differ substantially in cost and the cheaper placement is found suitable, a detailed comparative-cost exercise is unnecessary.

The appellant appealed under section 11 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 from a decision of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal dated 8 October 2008. The Tribunal had largely dismissed the parents’ appeal against a statement of special educational needs issued by the London Borough of Lambeth, while requiring additional one-to-one support at the named maintained special school.

The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to determine the necessary speech and language therapy, had misunderstood or inadequately addressed evidence supporting Applied Behaviour Analysis, had misused its specialist expertise, had placed excessive weight on one witness, and had failed properly to apply section 9 of the Education Act 1996. The central issue was whether the absence of an Applied Behaviour Analysis programme meant that the proposed school could not meet the child’s needs.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The Tribunal’s decision was not a rehearing of the facts. The court’s task was to identify an error of law.
2. A specialist tribunal must explain the factual basis and reasoning sufficient to tell the parties why they had won or lost and to permit an appellate court to identify any question of law. Its reasons need not be an elaborate analysis of every point. The decision had to be read as a whole.
3. The Tribunal had lawfully dealt with speech and language therapy. Under [2003] ELR 286, a tribunal must not delegate its statutory duty or describe provision so vaguely that its decision cannot be discerned. Conversely, it need not specify every detail. The appropriate degree of flexibility is for the Tribunal, having regard to all relevant factors. It was lawful to leave assessment of the child’s detailed speech and language needs to specialists at the school, since therapy was available at either placement and this was not the decisive issue.
4. The Tribunal had properly evaluated the evidence concerning Applied Behaviour Analysis. Its reference to experience of other children did not show that it had lost sight of this child’s needs. Specialist expertise could be used to choose between conflicting courses supported by evidence. The Tribunal had not impermissibly displaced the evidence by substituting its own unsupported views. The criticisms based on [2003] EWHC 2987 had to be understood in the light of the later observations in [2005] EWCA Civ 988.
5. The weight given to the headteacher’s evidence was a matter for the Tribunal. It had seen and questioned the witnesses and was entitled to evaluate their evidence without implying dishonesty.
6. Section 9 of the Education Act 1996 applied. However, counsel’s responsible concession that the private placement was substantially more expensive meant that, once the maintained school was found capable of meeting the child’s needs, the outcome was effectively clear. Even allowing for the temporary additional support, the cost disparity remained overwhelming. No error of law was established.

1. Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal: On 8 October 2008, largely dismissed the parents’ appeal against the statement of special educational needs, but required additional one-to-one support at the named school.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 11 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 was dismissed. Judgment was entered for the respondent, with a costs order not to be enforced without leave and an order for taxation of the publicly funded appellant’s costs.