Ritchie & Ors v Joshlin & Ors

Testamentary capacity requires the testator to understand the nature and effect of the will, the extent of the property, and the claims to which effect should be given. The testator must also be free from a disorder of the mind or insane delusion that poisons affections, perverts the sense of right, or influences the disposition.

A person may disinherit children for irrational, harsh or morally unattractive reasons if those reasons arise from a sound mind. But where false beliefs are genuinely held as the product of mental disease and cause the exclusion, the will is invalid. Compliance with probate good practice and a doctor’s supportive opinion are important, but neither is conclusive.

Mary Gray Ritchie left almost her whole estate, including Chapel Farm, to the National Osteoporosis Society. Her four children challenged the 1998 will, alleging that she lacked testamentary capacity because paranoid and irrational beliefs about them influenced the disposition.

The experts agreed that Mary understood that she was making a will, knew the extent of her property, and understood the claims of her children. They differed on whether her repeated allegations of violence, neglect and dishonesty were deliberate lies or genuinely held delusions caused by a disorder of the mind.

The children also claimed Chapel Farm by proprietary estoppel and, alternatively, constructive trust. The central issues were whether the will was valid and, if not, whether any estoppel claim succeeded.

1. The will was invalid. The court found that Mary’s allegations against her children and others were untrue, but that she believed them to be true. They were not mere exaggerations. Her paranoia was a disease of the mind which produced irrational and delusional beliefs.
2. Applying Banks v Goodfellow (1870) 5 QB 549, the court accepted that the first three elements of testamentary capacity were satisfied. The decisive question was whether mental disease had poisoned Mary’s affections or perverted her sense of right. Her delusions caused her to exclude all her children, although the principal motive was exclusion rather than benefiting the charity. The court concluded that she would not have made that disposition but for those beliefs.
3. The solicitor’s preparation of the will and the attendance of Mary’s general practitioner were relevant evidence, but the guidance in Sharp v Adam [2006] WTLR 1059 did not make the doctor’s opinion conclusive. The doctor had not known the contents of the will, had not undertaken a formal assessment, and had examined Mary five weeks earlier for an unrelated matter.
4. The proprietary-estoppel discussion was obiter because the will was set aside. An assurance had to be sufficiently clear and intended to be relied upon, assessed in context. There was no sufficient assurance to Helen or Margaret. Any equity in favour of Willie had been satisfied on dissolution of the farming partnership. Jimmy, however, had worked without pay in the expectation of inheriting and would have been awarded compensation of £10,000 per year from 1992 to 2006.
5. The court considered that section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 was not a bar to a straightforward familial proprietary-estoppel claim without a contractual connection.
6. The grant of probate was revoked. Mary was treated as having died intestate. The proprietary-estoppel claim failed except to the limited extent identified.