Manning v King's College Hospital NHS Trust

A court deciding a case must make findings of fact from the evidence adduced before it. It is not ordinarily the court’s function to investigate events occurring after trial of its own motion. A party seeking to rely on later events must make an appropriate application, which may require permission to adduce further evidence, an adjournment, or reopening the trial. Authorities concerning subsequent evidence in solicitor’s negligence cases do not impose a general investigative duty in ordinary damages proceedings. A party cannot obtain permission to appeal on the basis that the judge failed to take a course which the party never invited the court to take.

The claimant, executor of the estate of Jane Louise Manning, had obtained damages of £475,191 against the defendant Trust under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The defendant already had permission to appeal against liability.

It sought further permission to appeal against two discrete quantum findings: damages for loss of services after Mr Manning’s death, and loss of dependency based on Mrs Manning’s prospective earnings. The defendant argued that the judge should have investigated what actually happened after trial and should have taken account of the recession when assessing prospective employment. The central issue was whether the judge was required to do so without an application or further evidence.

1. Permission refused. Both proposed appeals had no realistic prospect of success.
2. The court’s function was to make findings of fact from the evidence adduced at trial. It had no obligation, and no ordinary power, to make factual enquiries of its own motion about events occurring after the trial. If later facts were to be relied on, the defendant needed to apply for permission to adduce further evidence, seek an adjournment, request directions, or seek to reopen the trial. It made no such application despite several opportunities to do so.
3. Charles v Hugh James, Jones and Jenkins [2000] W.L.R. 1278 and Dudarec v Andrews [2006] EWCA Civ 256 concerned solicitor’s negligence claims in which evidence of what had actually happened was before the court. They did not support a proposition that a court must investigate later events without an application and without admissible further evidence. Those authorities were therefore distinguishable and irrelevant to the application as made.
4. The recession point was also untenable. No evidence or submissions concerning economic conditions or their effect on Mrs Manning’s employment prospects had been advanced at trial or before judgment. The assessment was necessarily broad, and there was insufficient material to enable the court to take judicial notice of a relevant change in employment prospects. The defendant had also accepted a related employment assumption and had not sought to withdraw it.
5. Permission to appeal against liability did not extend to the quantum judgment. Separate permission was required for the two quantum challenges.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): liability had previously been determined in the claimant’s favour, and permission to appeal had been granted on liability only. In this judgment the court refused permission to appeal against the two identified quantum findings.