Pounder, R (on the application of) v HM Coroner for the North and South Districts of Durham and Darlington

An inquest investigating a death in custody must properly examine circumstances that may have materially contributed to the death. Where the inquest treats the propriety or proportionality of restraint as a relevant issue, the jury must be directed on whether the restraint was lawful. Physical restraint is prima facie a trespass to the person and proportionality can be considered only after lawful authority is established.

Under the statutory scheme governing contracted-out secure training centres, the power to use force in support of good order and discipline is controlled by the Secure Training Centre Rules. It is not a free-standing power to use force whenever staff consider it appropriate. Where a failure to direct the jury on legality may have affected the findings, the inquisition should be quashed and a fresh inquiry ordered.

Adam Rickwood, aged 14, died by suicide while detained at Hassockfield Secure Training Centre. Shortly before his death he had been physically restrained after refusing to return to his cell. The restraint included a pain-compliance nose distraction technique.

At the inquest, the Coroner permitted investigation of the restraint and its possible contribution to the death but declined to rule on whether it was lawful, directing the jury not to consider that question. The jury made findings adverse to no particular aspect of the regime and did not identify the restraint as a contributing factor.

The claimant, Adam’s mother, sought judicial review of the inquisition. The central issues were whether the restraint was unlawful, whether the Coroner erred by withdrawing legality from the jury, and whether the error required a fresh inquest.

1. Application allowed. The inquisition was quashed and the matter remitted to the Coroner for a fresh inquiry.
2. The legal position governing restraint was clear. Sections 36 to 38 of the Secure Training Centre Rules 1998 defined the circumstances in which removal from association, force and physical restraint could be used. Section 9(3) and (4) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 did not confer a free-standing power to use force despite those rules.
3. The statutory power had to be interpreted compatibly with human rights principles. The detailed rules gave precise content to the otherwise general expression good order and discipline. On the evidence, Adam was not causing, threatening or inciting violence, damaging property or creating the risks specified by the rules. The order requiring him to return to his cell, the subsequent restraint and the nose distraction technique were therefore unlawful. The nose distraction technique was also unjustified, disproportionate and contrary to rule 37.
4. The Coroner erred in excluding legality from the jury’s consideration. Physical restraint is prima facie a trespass to the person. Whether it is reasonable or proportionate depends first on whether there is lawful authority. An inquiry into whether restraint was appropriate or proportionate could not properly be conducted without directions on legality.
5. The error was material. It affected the jury’s consideration of training, first response, system failures, the credibility of witnesses and whether the restraint contributed to the death. The jury’s answers could not safely be treated as unaffected by the erroneous directions. A fresh jury should consider the factual and causal issues, with appropriate legal directions and, if necessary, expert evidence.