Pascoe v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Ors

A decision confirming a compulsory purchase order is not unlawful merely because post-inquiry representations are not answered in express detail. The Secretary of State must understand and take relevant representations into account, but further procedural steps under the inquiry rules arise only where the specified statutory conditions are met. Reasons may lawfully adopt an inspector’s analysis where the representation adds no materially new issue.

When assessing an alternative regeneration scheme, the decision-maker may consider its planning status, funding, necessary consents, technical suitability, financial feasibility, expertise, track record and realistic prospects of delivery. A challenge which merely disputes the merits of that assessment does not establish an error of law.

The claimant owned a house within land subject to a compulsory purchase order for the widening of Edge Lane and associated regeneration in Liverpool. Following a public inquiry, the inspector recommended confirmation of the order, and the Secretary of State confirmed it.

The claimant challenged the confirmation under section 23(1) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981. She alleged that a later letter from the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment had been ignored or inadequately addressed, and that the inspector had unlawfully rejected an alternative scheme known as Plan B as undeliverable.

The central issues were whether the post-inquiry material triggered further procedural obligations and whether the assessment of Plan B disclosed an error of law.

1. Post-inquiry representations. Rule 17(4) of the Compulsory Purchase by Non-Ministerial Acquiring Authorities (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1990 required further notification and an opportunity for representations only if the Secretary of State differed from the inspector on a material matter of fact, or took new evidence or a new matter of fact into consideration and was for that reason disposed to disagree with the inspector’s recommendation. The Secretary of State had taken the CABE letter into account, but was entitled to conclude that its request to examine alternatives had already been met by the inquiry’s consideration and rejection of Plan B.
2. The CABE letter contained comments going to important highway and townscape issues, but it did not add a materially new judgment requiring separate reasons. The inspector had already considered the relevant qualities of the buildings, the alternative proposals and the case for demolition. The Secretary of State was therefore entitled to adopt the inspector’s reasoning. A decision-maker need not provide a separate response to every comment where the substance of the issue has already been addressed.
3. Deliverability of alternatives. The inspector was entitled to assess Plan B by reference to its lack of planning permission, funding, listed building consent, technical support, feasibility evidence, relevant expertise and delivery track record. He was also entitled to consider the highway authority’s opposition, the benefit-to-cost ratio, compulsory acquisition difficulties and the absence of credible evidence supporting area-wide refurbishment. These matters were relevant to whether the alternative had a realistic prospect of implementation.
4. The claimant’s challenge to that assessment substantially disputed the merits rather than identifying an error of law. Both grounds therefore failed. The claim was dismissed. The claimant was ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs, subject to the usual rules for publicly funded litigation, and permission to appeal was refused.

The judgment does not state an appellate history for the present claim. It records that an earlier compulsory purchase order for the area had previously been quashed, but that earlier decision is not identified by citation.