Knowsley Housing Trust v Prescott & Anor

When possession is sought under ground 14 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988 following serious criminal conduct, the conduct need not have occurred inside the dwelling. Conduct in its locality may suffice. The court must focus on the future when deciding whether to postpone possession. An immediate order will ordinarily be appropriate unless cogent evidence provides a sound basis for believing that the conduct will cease. The seriousness and scale of the offending, its potential effect on the locality, the tenant’s failure to provide assurances, and the social landlord’s duty to manage its estate are material considerations. An appellate court should be slow to interfere with the trial judge’s discretion, but may exercise the discretion afresh where the first-instance judge proceeded on an error of principle and the evidence does not depend on witness assessment.

Knowsley Housing Trust sought possession of the Prescotts’ assured tenancy under the Housing Act 1988, relying on rent arrears and Mr Prescott’s convictions for conspiracy to supply cocaine and amphetamines. The County Court held that possession was reasonable but postponed the order, subject to conditions. The Trust appealed against postponement and against the absence of a costs order against Mrs Prescott.

The High Court considered whether the criminal conduct was sufficiently connected with the dwelling, whether there was a sound basis for expecting it to cease, whether the first-instance judge had erred in principle, and whether the costs decision disclosed a separate error.

1. Appeal on possession. The appeal was allowed on postponement. The County Court judge had given too little weight to the scale of Mr Prescott’s drug dealing, too much weight to the fact that the dealing did not occur in the house, and had failed to focus on the future.
2. Ground 14 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988 distinguishes between an offence involving the use of the dwelling and an indictable offence committed in the dwelling or its locality. The latter does not require the criminal conduct to have taken place inside the tenant’s home. The proximity of the drug factory and the industrial scale of the operation made the conduct sufficiently serious in the present case.
3. The court’s power to postpone possession is discretionary, but the relevant inquiry is prospective. Before postponement could properly be considered, there had to be cogent evidence providing a sound basis for hope that the conduct leading to the convictions would cease. There was no such evidence. Neither defendant gave oral evidence, and Mrs Prescott provided no satisfactory assurance or undertaking.
4. The seriousness of the offending, its potential to blight the locality, and the Housing Trust’s responsibility as a social landlord to keep its estate free from such activity outweighed the length of the tenancy and the presence of the adult daughter. An outright possession order was proportionate.
5. Remittal was unnecessary. The defendants’ rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights were satisfied by the County Court hearing and the appeal. The High Court therefore exercised the discretion afresh and substituted an outright order for possession.
6. The costs appeal disclosed no separate error. The County Court judge was entitled to make the costs order he made in relation to Mrs Prescott.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): allowed the appeal concerning postponement of possession, exercised the discretion afresh, and substituted an outright possession order. The separate costs challenge was rejected.
• St Helens County Court: held that possession was reasonable but postponed the order subject to conditions and made no order for costs against Mrs Prescott.