Herman Ramdass v Marilyn Bahaw-Nanan

A statutory tenant who retains possession under rent-restriction legislation does not thereby hold a contractual tenancy or an interest in land. A later statute converting every qualifying tenancy into a statutory lease does not extend to a statutory tenancy unless its wording does so. “By operation of law or otherwise” describes how a contractual interest may be acquired; it does not remove the contractual-tenancy requirement. Legislation conferring substantial benefits on tenants at the expense of landlords’ property rights should be construed with some degree of strictness. Applicable law is generally assessed at judgment, so an expired rent-restriction statute cannot support a later compensation order unless the right had accrued.

The respondent claimed possession and mesne profits from the appellant, who remained in occupation of land formerly let to his father. The trial judge ordered possession, awarded mesne profits, and found that the appellant was a statutory tenant under the Rent Restriction Act, but not entitled to conversion into a statutory lease under the Land Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act. The Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed the appeal without giving written reasons. The Board granted leave but excluded a new adverse-possession argument. The central issues were whether the appellant was a statutory tenant on 1 June 1981 and whether a statutory tenancy was converted into a 30-year statutory lease.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed except that mesne profits were directed to run only from 23 February 2002. The parties were given 21 days to make written submissions on costs.
2. Unpleaded statutory protection. The court was entitled, and had a duty, to consider whether a tenant was protected by statute even though the issue had not been pleaded or raised by the tenant. The Board accepted the approach supported by Smith v Poulter [1947] KB 339.
3. Statutory tenancy. The Rent Restriction (Re-enactment and Validation) Act 1981 was construed as extending the Rent Restriction Act for three years to 23 February 1984. Subsequent re-enactments continued it until 23 February 2002. On the facts, the appellant succeeded his father as a statutory tenant and remained one until the Act expired.
4. Statutory lease conversion. The definition of “tenant” in the Land Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act required an interest under a contractual tenancy. A statutory tenant had only a personal right to remain in occupation, not an interest in land or a contractual tenancy. The words “by operation of law or otherwise” concerned the mode by which a contractual interest was acquired. Section 15(1) of the Rent Restriction Act preserved contractual terms for a statutory tenancy but did not convert the statutory relationship into a contractual one. The Board approved the conclusions in De Hayney v Ali Mag. App. No 169 of 1984 and Alexander v Rampersad Civ. App. No 11 of 1989.
5. Compensation. The discussion was not necessary to the appeal because the compensation award was not challenged. Nevertheless, section 14(5) of the Rent Restriction Act could not support an order made after the Act expired. Applicable law is generally determined at judgment, and no accrued right to compensation had vested before expiry. The Board also accepted that section 15(1) of the Rent Restriction (Dwelling-Houses) Act could not survive expiration of the principal Act.

1. Privy Council: Allowed the appeal only to the limited extent of directing that mesne profits run from 23 February 2002; otherwise dismissed the appeal.
2. Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: On 11 January 2008, dismissed the appellant’s appeal without calling on the respondent’s counsel and did not provide written reasons.
3. Trial court: Ventour J ordered possession on 5 July 2004, awarded mesne profits from 1978, and awarded the appellant $30,000 compensation for the house. Written reasons followed on 3 January 2007.